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Are U.S. nuclear weapons still needed in Europe now that the threat that 
brought them there is gone?  This thesis examines whether basing theater 
nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive for 
maintaining European security.  U.S. and NATO policymakers adhere to political 
and military utility arguments, while others argue TNWs in Europe are 
irrelevant—their utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic 
interdependence, modern conventional capabilities and the existential deterrent 
of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.  Nonproliferation and arms control advocates 
argue TNWs are counterproductive because they enhance, rather than deter 
proliferation, undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede 
cooperation in the NATO-Russia security relationship. 
This thesis demonstrates how economic and political ties, including 
widespread participation in nuclear planning, the increasingly important nuclear 
taboo, prospects for conventional deterrence and the U.S. strategic nuclear 
umbrella render TNWs in Europe irrelevant.  Emphasizing their utility provides 
incentive for others to join the “nuclear club,” degrades the nonproliferation 
regime, and creates a roadblock for NATO-Russian arms control and 
nonproliferation efforts.  This thesis recommends withdrawing U.S. theater 
nuclear weapons from Europe, relying instead on a strategy of conventional 
deterrence and reassurance while maintaining general nuclear deterrence via 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union 
dramatically changed the security environment of Europe, which previously had 
been envisaged as the Cold War battleground between NATO and the Red 
Army.  With the virtual disappearance of the Soviet threat and the emergence of 
twenty-first century threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)1, allies on both sides of the Atlantic began to reevaluate the political and 
military utility of existing security strategies, including the forward basing of U.S. 
theater nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe.2  These weapons had profound 
implications in shaping the political and military landscape of Europe in the 
second half of the twentieth century—deterring Soviet aggression, reassuring 
NATO Allies of American commitment and protection under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella, and fostering stability in the midst of a hostile East-West relationship—
yet their relative importance today is much less clear. 
This thesis asks whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe is a 
useful, irrelevant or counterproductive strategy for maintaining security in Europe 
in today’s security environment.  Useful, in this context, refers to political and 
military utility for deterring aggression against Europe, maintaining U.S. nuclear 
commitments, dissuading other states from pursuing nuclear weapons, and 
defeating potential aggressors should conflict arise.  U.S. policymakers adhere to 
the political and military utility arguments, especially in the wake of September 11 
and the new emphasis on countering the proliferation and use of WMD.  Others 
argue that TNWs in Europe are irrelevant, meaning that their political and military 
utility has been supplanted by political, cultural and economic interdependence, 
the ever-increasing capabilities of conventional forces and the existential 
 
1 WMD are “weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or being used in 
such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.”  Usually, WMD refers to nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons.  See Introduction to Countering the Proliferation and Use of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, ed. Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel, 
USAF Institute for National Security Studies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 2. 
2 Nomenclature for this category of nuclear weapons varies, including “tactical,” “sub-
strategic,” “non-strategic,” and “battlefield.”  This thesis uses “theater nuclear weapons” to identify 
this category of nuclear weapons. 
2 
deterrent provided by U.S. strategic nuclear weapons.  Nonproliferation and arms 
control advocates vehemently argue that TNWs are counterproductive because 
they enhance, rather than deter proliferation, undermine the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and impede progress in the NATO-Russia security 
relationship.    
This thesis approaches the issue of forward basing TNWs in Europe from 
a pragmatic point of view, seeking to enhance European security while reducing 
the risk of nuclear conflict through cooperation.  The thesis views international 
security in the neo-liberalist tradition, accepting as a starting position the 
fundamental paradigm set forth by neo-realism, that the international system is 
governed by anarchy, where states are the primary actors, and these states are 
motivated by power and state interests.  While cooperation in national security 
affairs is inherently difficult, it is also increasingly important in a security 
environment marked by global threats and WMD.  From this approach the thesis 
finds TNWs in Europe irrelevant in some ways and counterproductive in others.  
The thesis recommends removing U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, 
relying instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while 
maintaining general nuclear deterrence via strategic forces.  The remainder of 
this chapter offers a brief background on forward basing TNWs in Europe, 
discusses issues of definition regarding theater nuclear weapons, highlights the 
current policy debate, and describes the organization of the thesis. 
 
A. BACKGROUND  
For over fifty years the United States has stationed nuclear weapons on 
the European continent.  Beginning in 1953, the United States introduced theater 
nuclear weapons in Europe as a military instrument designed to offset the 
perceived Soviet conventional military advantage, which emerged following the 
Second World War.  NATO integrated TNWs into a strategy calling for immediate 
and overwhelming use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, which 
ultimately became known as massive retaliation. 
3 
With the emergence of the Soviet capability to threaten the U.S. homeland 
during the 1960s, NATO adopted a flexible response strategy, under which 
TNWs created a condition of coupling between the United States and Europe 
and forged a transatlantic link.  Formally adopted in 1967, flexible response 
emerged from the concept of extended deterrence, wherein the threat of strategic 
nuclear retaliation which deterred a Soviet attack on the United States was 
extended to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe.  NATO states disagreed 
over how to extend the U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship to Europe, giving rise 
to various extended deterrence strategies, however the Allies agreed on the 
need to maintain Alliance cohesion in the larger context of the Cold War 
environment.  The debate on extending deterrence centered on concerns within 
NATO over the U.S. commitment to European security and the credibility of the 
U.S. nuclear retaliatory threat if the Soviets invaded.  The inherent ambiguity of 
flexible response as to when and how theater nuclear weapons would be used 
masked the debate while at the same time providing a seemingly coherent 
strategy for the defense of Europe.  Thus, the strategy of forward basing U.S. 
theater nuclear weapons on European soil ultimately achieved the condition of 
coupling necessary to link U.S. and Western European security.  Despite often 
acrimonious debate, the essential political and military utility of U.S. TNWs based 
in Europe—maintaining the transatlantic link and deterring Soviet conventional or 
nuclear aggression—remained the same throughout the remainder of the Cold 
War. 
 
B. ISSUES OF DEFINITION 
Before analyzing the strategy of forward basing U.S. theater nuclear 
weapons in today’s strategic environment, the term itself must be defined.  As a 
category, TNWs generally include a broad array of atomic explosives, including 
nuclear landmines, nuclear artillery shells and air-dropped or missile-launched 
nuclear warheads.  Yet precisely defining this category of weapons is ambiguous 
at best.  Unlike the threshold between conventional and nuclear weapons, it is 
inherently difficult to distinguish between theater and strategic nuclear weapons.  
4 
                                           
Nevertheless, attempts have been made to do so, based on range, yield, target, 
national ownership, delivery vehicle, capability and by exclusion.3
Range-based definitions have been useful in that differentiating between 
intercontinental weapons and shorter-range weapons used on the battlefield 
seems relatively easy.  In this approach, intercontinental systems are classified 
as strategic and shorter-range systems are classified as theater weapons.  Yet 
considering that some systems—tactical aircraft utilizing air refueling or Sea 
Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)—can approximate the range of 
intercontinental nuclear weapons, the range-based definition can be problematic. 
The yield of TNWs is generally, although not always, lower than that of 
strategic nuclear weapons.  Theater nuclear weapon yields range from a low end 
of .1 kiloton (KT) to a maximum of 1 megaton.4  Some strategic weapons, on the 
other hand, have yields as low as 5 KT.  Such overlap in weapon yields makes it 
difficult to define TNWs on this basis. 
While classifications based on range or yield are helpful in determining 
capabilities of these weapons, they fall short of defining the true nature of these 
weapons precisely because these classifications leave open the question of how 
the weapons are to be used.  A more useful means of defining these weapons 
could be by the types of targets they are intended to strike.  In this regard, TNWs 
were intended to strike military targets on the battlefield that are connected with 
the employment of combat forces whereas strategic weapons were designed to 
attack the adversary’s homeland, including nuclear missile sites, industry or 
political targets.  Today, however, “tactical” targets can have strategic 
implications and vice versa, thus blurring the distinction between target types. 
Another means of definition may be by national ownership.  While the 
nuclear weapons of China, India and Pakistan possess strategic value to these 
countries, they would be considered theater nuclear weapons in the United 
 
3 Andrea Gabbitas, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Definition,” in Controlling 
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. 
Klingenberger, USAF Institute for National Security Studies (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2001), 
28. 
4 Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar, “Introduction,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emerging 
Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, ed. Brian Alexander, Alistair Millar, (Washington 
DC: Brassey’s, 2003), 5. 
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States or Russia.5  Clearly, such a definition would complicate, rather than refine, 
nuclear issues, especially in the area of arms control. 
Other means of defining TNWs such as by delivery vehicle or capability 
pose similar problems as those identified above.  Using delivery vehicle as a 
definition creates difficulties because both strategic and theater nuclear weapons 
can be delivered from the same aircraft.  Classifying weapons capable of 
destroying strategic targets as “strategic” and those only capable of taking out 
targets on the battlefield as “theater” once again blurs the distinction between 
target types. 
Finally, theater nuclear weapons could be defined “by exclusion.”  This 
approach entails identifying theater nuclear weapons as all of the nuclear 
weapons not counted under existing strategic arms control treaties.  Such a 
definition makes sense because it avoids the pitfalls associated with the 
classifications identified above, yet it opens the door to including TNWs in future 
arms control negotiations.  With respect to U.S. theater nuclear weapons in 
Europe—approximately 150 gravity bombs based in seven countries, this 
definition seems appropriate.6
 
C. THE CURRENT POLICY DEBATE 
The contemporary debate centers on whether the strategy of forward 
basing U.S. theater nuclear weapons is useful, irrelevant or counterproductive to 
maintaining security in Europe in the twenty-first century.  This debate is 
extremely significant in today’s security environment where proliferation and the 
potential use of weapons of mass destruction reign as the greatest security 
threat.  The issues surrounding the debate are broad and complex, and they 
warrant serious analysis if NATO is to move beyond the Cold War security 
framework. 
 
5 Gabbitas, “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” 30. 
6 Stanley R. Sloan, “NATO Nuclear Strategy Beyond the Cold War,” in Controlling Non-
Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities, Ed. by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. 
Klingenberger, USAF Institute for National Security Studies (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 2001), 
48. 
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1. Political and Military Utility 
At one end of the spectrum, proponents of the forward basing strategy cite 
its continued political and military utility in today’s security environment.  Official 
U.S. government documents identify general areas of utility for TNWs.  First, their 
deployment on the European continent is “important to the continued viability of 
NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy.”7  Second, they “provide greater flexibility in 
the design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents 
decisively…Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to 
withstand non-nuclear attack (for example, deep underground bunkers or bio-
weapon facilities).”8  This capability represents the possible role of TNWs in U.S. 
counterproliferation efforts.  For U.S. policymakers, this utility is reflected 
consistently in the most recent National Security Strategy, National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  
According to National Nuclear Security Administration administrator, Linton 
Brooks, the Nuclear Posture Review identifies four policy goals served by U.S. 
nuclear forces: Assure, Dissuade, Deter and Defeat.9
United States policymakers seek to assure friends and allies of the U.S. 
commitment to them and the capability to follow through on that commitment 
across a broad range of military contingencies.  This assurance enhances 
nonproliferation by allowing NATO Allies to forgo attempts to develop nuclear 
weapons of their own.  Policymakers also seek to dissuade potential adversaries 
from competing with U.S. capabilities through robust forces and infrastructure 
which they have no hope of matching.  U.S. nuclear forces deter any threats that 
do arise by holding at risk the assets which a potential adversary values most.  
Finally, the NPR calls for the capability to decisively defeat any opponent in the 
event deterrence should fail. 
 
7 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts], 2002. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (accessed July 2004), 44. 
8 Ibid., 12-13. 
9 Linton F. Brooks, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Programs,” Speech presented to the 
Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, June 21, 2004. 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/2004conference/speeches/brooks.doc (accessed 
July 2004), 2. 
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  On the other side of the Atlantic, NATO assigns equal utility to the 
continued deployment of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe.  In keeping 
with modern European tradition, however, NATO places greater emphasis on 
political utility.  According to NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the Allies stated, 
“The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to 
preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war.”10  NATO places great 
emphasis on Alliance nuclear solidarity, stressing the value of risk- and burden-
sharing through the forward basing of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe.  
This solidarity is exemplified further in the Strategic Concept: “Nuclear forces 
based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and 
military link between the European and the North American members of the 
Alliance.”11  Although the circumstances under which NATO would contemplate 
the use of nuclear weapons are extremely remote, Alliance officials nevertheless 
view forward basing of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe as a useful 
strategy in today’s security environment. 
 
2. Political and Military Relevance 
In the center of the contemporary debate, some see theater nuclear 
weapons in Europe as politically and militarily irrelevant.  Analysts question 
whether TNWs deployed in Europe are responsible for maintaining the 
transatlantic link, or whether economic and political ties truly bind the United 
States and Europe.  The description provided by William Wallace in “Europe, The 
Necessary Partner” paints a much more complex picture where “transatlantic 
relations are embedded in a dense network of multilateral links, including annual 
meetings of the Group of Eight major industrialized nations, semiannual 
consultations among top officials, and shared membership in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).”12  According to then-
 
10 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, approved by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. 23-24 April 1999, 
NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed 
July 2004), para. 62. 
11 Ibid., para. 63 
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Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark, Europe and the 
United States remain linked by an “enormous degree of economic 
interdependence” which is complemented and reinforced “by political, cultural, 
and diplomatic ties of long standing.”13  This vision of the transatlantic 
relationship suggests a greater confluence of interests today which render the 
symbolic basing of a few hundred TNWs in Europe irrelevant.   
Moreover, the same logic leading NATO to a reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons for European security further supports the idea that TNWs have 
become irrelevant.  If, as the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept asserts, “NATO's 
ability to…mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved,” 
and “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the 
strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States,” 
then the deployment of TNWs on European soil is unnecessary. 14   U.S. 
strategic forces, available for Alliance collective defense under Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in the event of an attack on any NATO-member state, also 
serve to “preserve the peace and prevent coercion.”  In this context, an 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) armed with a low-yield warhead provides 
the same, if not greater utility than a gravity bomb dropped from a tactical aircraft 
based in Europe.  The latter becomes irrelevant for European security. 
Theater nuclear weapons based in Europe may also be seen as irrelevant 
from the standpoint of credibility and the “nuclear taboo.”  To be credible, the 
target must believe the deterrer has the will to carry out its threats.  According to 
deterrence scholar Patrick Morgan, “Threat credibility and effectiveness also 
depend on the perceived legitimacy of the means.”15  Given the long-standing 
“nuclear taboo” and the very real political consequences of using nuclear 
 
12 William Wallace, “Europe, The Necessary Partner,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2001), vol. 
80, no. 3, 17. 
13 Wesley Clark, “The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead,” Parameters (Winter 
1999/2000), vol. 29, iss. 4, 2. 
14 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, para. 62-64. 
15 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276 
[Emphasis in original]. 
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weapons, especially in a preemptive manner, the likelihood of a U.S. president 
choosing to employ TNWs is remote.  Efforts to make TNWs more “usable,” such 
as the current feasibility studies of a “robust nuclear earth penetrator” or “bunker 
buster,” may enhance the capabilities of TNWs, but will do little to alleviate the 
taboo against their use.  From this standpoint, these weapons offer no real 
credibility advantage over low-yield strategic nuclear forces, and pose a far less 
credible threat than modern conventional forces. 
In the eyes of the military, conventional deterrence may be more effective 
today than deterrence based on theater nuclear weapons.  Due to the most 
recent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), conventional forces, particularly within 
the context of overwhelming superiority by the Untied States, are well suited for 
this role.  The technological advances in surveillance, information, and precision 
along with requisite investments in these capabilities have created “sophisticated 
nonnuclear weapons [that] can now hold at risk those assets most highly valued 
by potential aggressors…”16  For NATO, this translates into a reversal of the 
Cold War conventional imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union.  If—and this 
seems highly unlikely given the post-Cold War security relationship with Russia—
a future aggressive Russia threatened Europe, NATO would hold the advantage 
in conventional superiority.  In the unlikely event that a conflict escalated to 
nuclear war, the supreme guarantee of European security would still be found in 
the U.S. strategic arsenal.  U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe are no longer 
required to offset Russian conventional military power; they are irrelevant as a 
deterrent threat. 
With respect to rogue states and proliferators, the concepts of rationality, 
retaliatory threat and unacceptable damage point to holding at stake what these 
states value most—regime survival.  A distinction arises here between 
“unacceptable” and “unbearable” damage.17  While massive nuclear punishment 
may be unacceptable to the leader of a rogue regime, it may not be unbearable if 
 
16 John C. Hopkins and Steven A. Maaranen, “Nuclear Weapons in Post-Cold War 
Deterrence,” Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 
1997), 117. 
17 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 265. 
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the regime survives.  The best way to deter proliferation and use of WMD by 
these regimes, according to Morgan, “is not by threatening a massive WMD 
response…but by being able to threaten destruction of the leaders and regime 
with conventional forces...”18  In this way, deterring the proliferation and use of 
WMD is feasible, and the credibility of the deterrence is enhanced by keeping the 
retaliatory threat below the nuclear threshold.   
While the United States, and by extension, NATO, possess the world’s 
most capable conventional forces today, conventional deterrence will only be 
enhanced by future developments in strategic strike.  According to the recently 
released Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic 
Strike Forces, the objective for strategic strike is: “To provide future Presidents 
an integrated, flexible, and highly reliable set of strike options with today’s 
tactical-level flexibility but on a global scale.”19  The Task Force recommends 
sweeping changes in U.S. strategic strike capability, particularly in conventional 
weapons.  The recommendation for the Air Force to retain fifty Peacekeeper 
ICBMs and convert them to carry conventional warheads, for example, would 
provide a thirty-minute response capability for worldwide strategic strike.20  This, 
along with other recommendations such as a new non-nuclear ballistic missile 
launched from the Navy’s cruise-missile submarine assets, will provide an 
enhanced, credible, conventional deterrent backed up by improved strategic 
nuclear forces.21  From its comprehensive analysis of strategic strike, the Task 
Force recommends eliminating the role of TNWs delivered by deployed dual-
capable aircraft; the report asserts: “There is no obvious military need for these 
 
18 Ibid., 276. 
19 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future 
Strategic Strike Forces, Office of the Undersecretary for Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, February 2004, 1-5. 
20 Ibid., 1-8. 
21 The Task Force Report identifies the need for nuclear weapons that produce much lower 
collateral damage (great precision, deep penetration, greatly reduced radioactivity) and 
recommends research and development along these lines.  See Report of the Defense Science 
Board, 1-10. 
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systems…”22  In the military context, as in the political, theater nuclear weapons 
based in Europe are irrelevant in today’s security environment. 
  
3. Counterproductive in Today’s Security Environment 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, many policy analysts and arms 
control advocates view TNWs forward based in Europe as counterproductive in 
today’s security environment.  This position emerges from NATO’s schizophrenic 
approach to deterrence and nonproliferation.   
Deterrence has changed since the Cold War.  The difference is that 
today’s strategic environment is governed by a situation of general deterrence as 
opposed to immediate deterrence.23  Theater nuclear weapons were deployed 
and maintained in Europe during the Cold War as a strategy based on the 
perception of an immediate deterrence situation.  Although the security 
environment has changed dramatically, the strategy remained the same.  The 
continued deployment of U.S. TNWs in Europe is a strategy in search of a threat.   
The problem imposed by this situation is precisely that threats will emerge.  
This is the classic “security dilemma” and “spiral model” theory which still 
operates today.  According to Robert Jervis, “When states seek the ability to 
defend themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because they 
gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, 
will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.”24  
Continuing to emphasize the utility of TNWs could have disastrous ramifications 
for nonproliferation because if the world’s greatest military power identifies a role 
for these weapons in national security, weaker states will surely follow suit. 
 
22 Ibid., 5-13. 
23 Immediate deterrence exists in a crisis, or similar situation in which an opponent is 
contemplating and preparing an attack.  The deterrer issues specific threats with specific military 
capabilities to coerce the opponent from attacking.  In general deterrence, the deterrer maintains 
broad capabilities and issues general threats to keep any potential opponent from seriously 
thinking about attacking. 
24 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 64. 
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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is regarded as the cornerstone 
of the international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Despite 
its long history and ardent support in many corners, the NPT has proven 
unsuccessful in disarming the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons material to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).  
Indeed, as the recent discoveries of Pakistan’s proliferation activity 
demonstrates, the “spread and potential use of nuclear weapons remains all too 
real.”25  At a time when nonproliferation reigns as the world’s greatest security 
concern, emphasizing the warfighting prospects and usability of theater nuclear 
weapons enhances, rather than deters, proliferation of WMD.  In discussing the 
possible impact of the new Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Binoy Kampmark 
acknowledges, “A new kind of proliferation is being encouraged in the field of 
smaller nuclear devices.  The new strategy of the NPR suggests the employment 
of nuclear weapons against signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Iraq, 
Syria, North Korea, Libya) notwithstanding that these countries officially do not 
have nuclear weapons.  This merely encourages them to seek countering 
technologies.”26  Bush administration officials rebuff such conclusions, as NNSA 
Administrator Linton Brooks decried in June 2004: “I’ve never met anyone in the 
Administration who can foresee circumstances in which we would consider 
nuclear preemption to counter rogue state WMD threats.”27  Perception is reality, 
however, and for rogue states the perception is that nuclear weapons equate to 
strength and security.  Emphasizing their utility, through the continued 
deployment in Europe, serves to codify this perception. 
NATO’s nuclear doctrine is at odds with member-state commitments to the 
NPT.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the Alliance’s controversial 
interpretation of the prohibition to transfer nuclear weapons under NPT Articles I 
and II.  Many analysts and signatories to the NPT question whether NATO’s 
 
25 George Perkovich and others, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security 
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2004), 9. 
26 Binoy Kampmark, “America’s Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Terrorism,” Contemporary 
Review (April 2003), vol. 282, no. 1647, 209.  
27 Brooks, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Programs,” 8. 
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nuclear sharing arrangements fall in line with the letter and spirit of the treaty.  
According to a Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN) Research 
Report, the U.S. view is that the NPT “does not deal with arrangements for 
deployment of nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any 
transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were 
made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.”28  
This exception—the treaty does not apply in time of war—created a loophole 
through which NATO maintained its sharing arrangements for employing theater 
nuclear weapons deployed on Allied territory.  In a specific effort to close the 
loophole, the 1985 NPT Review Document included language making the NPT 
provisions under Articles I and II controlling “under any circumstances,” however, 
this provision is more politically than legally binding.29  The United States and 
NATO continue to subscribe to their controversial interpretation of the NPT. 
The political implications for nonproliferation and future arms control 
efforts are potentially severe.30  If, in the course of the War on Terrorism, NATO 
nuclear doctrine evolved to include a role for counterproliferation, such as is 
widely attributed to U.S. doctrine under the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. 
theater nuclear weapons in Europe could conceivably be used against those 
possessing or believed to possess WMD or their means of delivery.  According to 
the PENN Report, policy changes along these lines were in the works during the 
2000 review of NATO’s strategy document MC400.  NATO recognizes the 
controversial nature of this issue, as highlighted in an interview with a Senior 
NATO Diplomat: “It’s an uncomfortable topic that people prefer not to discuss. It 
does raise questions, I know, under the NPT, the negative security 
assurances.”31  Negative security assurances are promises given by the nuclear-
weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states 
 
28 “Questions of Command and Control – NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT”, PENN 
Research Report 2000.1, (Berlin: Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 2000). 
http://www.bits.de/public/researchreport/rr00-1-1.htm (accessed August 2004), 22. 
29 Ibid., 27. 
30 Ibid., 32. 
31 Ibid., 33. 
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party to the NPT unless those states attack the nuclear-weapons state, or a state 
with which it has a security commitment, in association or alliance with another 
nuclear-weapons state.  The outcome of these discussions, as well as details 
from the 2002 Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group 
guidance on NATO’s dual-capable aircraft posture, remain classified.  Pursuing 
such a policy, however, could signal NATO’s intent to violate the Negative 
Security Assurances given to NNWS in 1995, constitute a breach of Articles I and 
II of the NPT concerning nuclear sharing, and ultimately undermine NATO’s 
nonproliferation and arms control efforts.  
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) are valuable 
nonproliferation and arms control tools, yet U.S. TNWs based in Europe 
undermine their effectiveness.  CSBMs are intended to reduce the likelihood of 
armed conflict and prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation.  According to 
Ronald Lehman, Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), such as 
positive security assurances (PSAs)—commitments to aid nations threatened by 
WMD that have agreed to forego these weapons—and negative security 
assurances (NSAs)—commitments not to use WMD against nations who have 
agreed to forego these weapons, can be effective from a counterproliferation 
standpoint provided they are accompanied by “a change in either real intent or in 
real military capability.”32  While there is no guarantee that CSBMs will be 
effective, their intrinsic value is psychological, in the same way that the value of 
deterrence is psychological.   
NATO’s nuclear-weapon states have issued both positive and negative 
security assurances as well as pledged support for other CSBMs such as 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ).  Yet proliferation still occurs.  NATO 
officials argue that the Alliance’s “residual sub-strategic nuclear arsenal—which 
has been dramatically reduced and its land-based forces de-alerted and de-
 
32 Ronald F. Lehman, “Reassurance and Dissuasion: Countering the Motivation to Acquire 
WMD,” in Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, ed. Peter L. 
Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel, (New York: McGraw-Hill., 1998), 108. 
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mated—is not responsible for nuclear proliferation.”33  While U.S. TNWs in 
Europe may not be solely responsible for nuclear proliferation, NATO’s Janus-
faced nuclear policy clearly contributes to the problem.  According to a 
September 2003 Policy Brief issued by the Middle Powers Initiative, “The 
maintenance of a security policy based on nuclear weapons for the purpose of 
achieving greater political power, however, is extremely dangerous, since it 
inevitably invites others to follow suit.”34  Moreover, emphasizing the utility of 
these weapons undermines NATO’s moral credibility in influencing other states to 
forego nuclear programs of their own.  NATO’s nuclear schizophrenia hampers 
the effectiveness of CSBMs designed to promote nonproliferation. 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe have also long been a source of 
friction in the NATO-Russia security relationship, and they continue to pose 
difficulties today.  Both NATO and Russian officials tout partnership and 
cooperation as the foundation of their post-Cold War security relationship.  From 
the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established in May 2002, NATO 
member states and Russia endeavor “to work more closely together towards the 
common goal of building a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic 
Area.”35  Yet the continued deployment of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in 
Europe serves as a roadblock to cooperation. 
NATO and Russian policymakers maintain diametrically opposed positions 
on TNWs.  NATO adheres to the political utility and deterrent effects of its TNW 
arsenal, while at the same time voicing a desire for Russia to reduce and gain 
control of its theater nuclear forces.  Russia, on the other hand, refuses to 
“consider negotiations to control its tactical nuclear arsenal if the United States 
 
33 “Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, 
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament,” NATO Press Release M-NAC-2(2000)121, 
para. 100. 
34 “Middle Powers Initiative Brief on NATO Nuclear Policy,” September 2003. 
http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs.html (accessed July 2004). 
35 “NATO-Russia Relations.” http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html (accessedJuly 
2004). 
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will not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe.”36  Given the state of its 
conventional forces, Russia values the deterrent effect of its TNW arsenal much 
the same as NATO did during the Cold War.  NATO enlargement only 
accentuates such Russian insecurities.  By emphasizing the utility of these 
weapons, and maintaining a strategy of forward basing them in Europe, NATO 
perpetuates an immediate deterrence situation where one does not exist.  
Removing these weapons could be a first step toward persuading Russia that its 
TNWs are equally irrelevant and create the possibility for genuine arms control 
for theater nuclear weapons.  Even if abandoning the long-standing policy of 
forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe proves insufficient to induce Russia to 
eliminate its theater nuclear weapons, this step could remove an obstacle to 
further cooperation at relatively little strategic cost given that it still maintains 
general deterrence via U.S. strategic nuclear forces. 
Opening the door to cooperation with Russia by removing U.S. theater 
nuclear weapons from Europe could have spillover effects in the area of 
nonproliferation.  The security of Russia’s theater nuclear weapons is an issue of 
great concern in the West.  This concern emerges from a lack of transparency in 
the Russian theater nuclear arsenal.  Alexander and Millar point out, “The lack of 
information about the size of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal raises 
uncertainties regarding the security of the storage of these weapons as well as 
about their protections against accidental, unauthorized, or illicit use.”37  This lack 
of transparency, combined with fears of “crime, corruption, incompetence, and 
institutional disintegration”38 in Russia create concern over the possibility of 
these weapons falling into the hands of rogue states or terrorists.  The 
concession of removing these weapons from Europe could pay dividends in 
 
36 Allistair Millar, “Russia, NATO, and Tactical Nuclear Weapons After 11 September,” in 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emerging Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, ed. Brian 
Alexander, Alistair Millar,  (Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2003), 90. 
37 Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar, eds., “Uncovered Nukes: An Introduction to Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons,” Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security 
Environment, 4. 
38 Allistair Millar, “Russia, NATO, and Tactical Nuclear Weapons After 11 September,” in 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emerging Threats in an Evolving Security Environment, 83. 
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terms of cooperation with Russia in the nonproliferation effort.  With respect to 
the NATO-Russian security relationship, maintaining the deployment of U.S. 
TNWs in Europe is a counterproductive strategy. 
The broad and complex issues sketched above highlight the contemporary 
debate over whether TNWs are useful, irrelevant or counterproductive in today’s 
security environment.  The analysis and strategic course of action proposed by 
this thesis offers a practical means of achieving European security while moving 




Chapter II provides background on Cold War deterrence and theater 
nuclear weapons.  This chapter explains why the United States deployed TNWs 
in Europe during the Cold War.  It discusses the evolution of the strategy of 
forward basing these weapons in Europe within the framework of extended 
deterrence.  The early years of the strategy are characterized by identifying 
TNWs as a military instrument of war within the context of massive retaliation.  
With the emergence of the Soviet capability to threaten the U.S. homeland, the 
Allies focused on extended deterrence and the strategy evolved into flexible 
response, under which TNWs created a condition of coupling between the United 
States and Europe, thereby forging the transatlantic link.   
Chapter III analyzes the political and military utility of TNWs today.  It 
explains why U.S. and NATO policymakers support the continued deployment of 
TNWs in Europe.  Beginning with the immediate post-Cold War force structure 
changes, the chapter examines U.S. conceptions of post-Cold War European 
security and deterrence.  Next, the chapter identifies emerging threats in the new 
security environment.  It highlights the U.S. vision of a role for TNWs in this new 
environment, including counterproliferation, which emerges from the National 
Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review.  The chapter then analyzes 
NATO’s support for basing U.S. TNWs in Europe.  It addresses NATO’s Strategic 
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Concept and nuclear doctrine, arguments for maintaining the transatlantic link 
through the continued deployment of TNWs in Europe and issues of nuclear 
assurance.  The chapter demonstrates that supporters of the TNW basing policy 
find political and military utility in these weapons not only for traditional 
deterrence, but also in a preemptive capacity for counterproliferation. 
Chapter IV analyzes the political and military relevance of TNWs today.  
This chapter questions whether basing these weapons in Europe is necessary to 
maintain European security.  The chapter begins by identifying the nature of the 
transatlantic link today as being primarily economic and political, with military 
links maintained via conventional forces.  Within this context, Europe and the 
United States remain coupled, and the U.S. strategic nuclear forces still provide 
the supreme guarantee for European security.  The chapter then identifies a 
usability paradox wherein attempts to make TNWs more “usable” fail because 
issues of credibility and the “nuclear taboo” raise serious questions about their 
potential use.  Finally, the chapter addresses prospects for conventional 
deterrence, including the recent revolution in military affairs (RMA), NATO 
conventional superiority, conventional threats to rogue regimes and the future of 
strategic strike.  The chapter demonstrates that the factors outlined above 
contribute to the irrelevance of TNWs based in Europe today. 
Chapter V analyzes the argument that TNWs are counterproductive in 
today’s security environment.  The chapter explains how forward basing TNWs in 
Europe negatively impacts nonproliferation and arms control efforts.  It begins by 
exploring NATO’s schizophrenic approach to deterrence and nonproliferation.  
Under a situation of general deterrence, forward basing TNWs in Europe is a 
strategy in search of a threat.  Emphasizing the utility of these weapons 
enhances rather than deters proliferation.  The chapter then addresses the U.S. 
controversial interpretation of the NPT with regard to nuclear sharing, 
demonstrating the potentially severe consequences of this arrangement for 
nonproliferation and arms control.   The continued deployment of TNWs in 
Europe and emphasis on their utility also undermines the confidence and security 
building measures issued by NATO’s nuclear-weapons states.  The chapter 
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analyzes the impact of NATO’s TNW policy on the NATO-Russia security 
relationship, addressing issues of partnership and cooperation, NATO 
Enlargement, arms control and nonproliferation.  This chapter demonstrates how 
the TNW basing policy is counterproductive in today’s security environment. 
Chapter VI brings the analysis together for policy prescription, addressing 
the question of where to go from here.  It begins by summarizing the arguments 
concerning political and military utility, relevance, and counter productivity of U.S. 
theater nuclear weapons in Europe.  I then offer two policy options: (1) 
maintaining the status quo, and (2) withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons 
from Europe. The political-military implications of each are evaluated.  In the final 
analysis, the thesis recommends withdrawing theater nuclear weapons from 
Europe in favor of a strategy emphasizing conventional deterrence supported by 
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II. THE COLD WAR – HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides historical background on Cold War deterrence and 
theater nuclear weapons.  The chapter explains why the United States deployed 
TNWs in Europe during the Cold War; this rationale forms the basis of the 
political and military utility argument today.  It begins with the early years of the 
strategy, characterizing TNWs as a military instrument of war within the context 
of massive retaliation.  Faced with a conventional military imbalance with the 
Soviet Union, the U.S. officials viewed TNWs as a military solution for deterring a 
Soviet attack.   
The chapter then turns to the evolution of the strategy of forward basing 
these weapons in Europe.  With the emergence of the Soviet capability to 
threaten the U.S. homeland and the subsequent nuclear stalemate, European 
security became tied to the concept of extended deterrence.  The chapter 
identifies the idea of coupling and discusses the debate surrounding the key 
issues of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear response and the U.S. commitment to 
Europe which were embedded in the various strategies of extended deterrence.  
Finally, the chapter details the development of flexible response, under which 
TNWs created a condition of coupling between the United States and Europe 
and forged a transatlantic link.  It discusses the essence of flexible response, and 
the political-military strategic debate within which the strategy of forward basing 
TNWs evolved.   
 
A. MASSIVE RETALIATION: A MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF WAR 
NATO first deployed TNWs in Europe in October 1953 beginning with the 
280mm atomic cannon, and the Honest John ballistic- and Matador ground-
launched cruise missiles the next year.  This deployment, which marked the 
beginning of the strategy of forward basing TNWs in Europe, began as a military 
instrument of war.  The overarching strategy for the defense of Europe was 
massive retaliation, which called for immediate, massive nuclear retaliation 
against the Soviet Union in response to Soviet attack.  Theater nuclear weapons, 
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Record points out, “were simply one element of a general strike plan, to be 
employed against the Soviets’ preponderant conventional forces in Europe in 
conjunction with strategic nuclear strikes against military and non-military targets 
in Russia itself.”39  The perceived conventional military imbalance between the 
NATO Allies and the Soviet Union was a critical factor in the decision to deploy 
U.S. TNWs in Europe. 
 
 1. The Conventional Imbalance 
From the beginning, NATO military planners operated on the perception 
that the Alliance sat on the losing side of a conventional military imbalance vis a 
vis the Soviet Union.  As NATO historian Gregory Pedlow points out in “The 
Evolution of NATO Strategy, 1949-1969,” Western military planners “believed 
that NATO was greatly inferior in conventional military strength to the Soviet 
Union and its Eastern European satellites.”40  This perception was largely based 
on practical considerations.  Recovering from the effects of the Second World 
War, Allies on both sides of the Atlantic lacked the political and economic will and 
capacity to build their conventional forces to the levels required to deter or 
defend against the massive Soviet army.  Recognizing this situation, NATO 
strategy document MC 14, “Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional 
Planning,” contained a warning from the NATO Standing Group that, “the North 
Atlantic Treaty nations should not be misled into planning in the frame of mind 
prevailing at the end of World War II, which was largely based on the enormous 
military power available to the Allies at that time.” 41  While NATO would require 
years to achieve previous force levels, the Soviet Union had “maintained, if not 
increased, her technical, military and economic capabilities.”42 The Standing 
Group further stated, “special emphasis must be laid on the necessity for 
 
39 Jeffrey Record, NATO’s Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues 
(Washington D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981), 13. 
40 Gregory W. Pedlow, “The Evolution of NATO Strategy, 1949-1969,” NATO Strategy 
Documents 1949-1969, Oct 98, NATO Archives. http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf 
(accessed July 2004), xi. 
41 Ibid., xiii. 
42 Ibid. 
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developing methods to compensate for numerical inferiority.”43  This perception 
of NATO conventional inferiority combined with U.S. nuclear dominance provided 
a ready military solution for the defense of Europe. 
 
2. The Military Solution  
Given the economic and political constraints, the military solution to the 
problem of European defense was relatively clear.  Theater nuclear weapons 
“offered a cheap means of offsetting the conventional force imbalance in 
Europe,” and served as a “substitute for robust conventional defenses.”44  By late 
1954, nuclear weapons, including TNWs, became the military solution for the 
defense of Europe, and were fully integrated into NATO strategy.  Indeed, NATO 
strategy document, MC 48, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military 
Strength for the Next Few Years,” argued that “NATO would be unable to prevent 
the rapid overrunning of Europe unless NATO immediately employed these 
weapons both strategically and tactically.”45  Thus, MC 48 sows the seeds of the 
massive retaliation strategy, formally associated with a later NATO strategy 
document, MC 14/2.   
Once these weapons were forward based in Europe, they served as an 
even greater impetus for European conventional force reductions and increased 
reliance on their deterrent effects.  As M. Leitenberg describes in Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives, “European political leaders applied 
substantial pressure on the Eisenhower administration to constantly increase the 
numbers of TNWs in Europe.”46  This pressure continued until the late 1960s 
when U.S. TNWs in Europe totaled approximately 7,000.47
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Record, NATO’s Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program, 13. 
45 Pedlow, “The Evolution of NATO Strategy,” xviii. 
46 M. Leitenberg, “Background Materials in Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” SIPRI, Tactical 
Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1978), 
13. 
47 Ivo H. Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 108. 
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By 1957 the acceptance of TNWs as the preferred military instrument of 
war was formalized through the first NATO “Guidelines” and the first equipping 
and training of non-US NATO forces with these weapons.48  The implication was 
that “SACEUR thenceforth was to base his forward planning on the assumption 
that a large range of nuclear weapons gradually would be introduced into both 
NATO and Soviet bloc armories.”49  Such was indeed the situation in Europe 
until 1960, “when it became clear that the credibility of threatening a massive 
nuclear strike against the Soviet Union had been undermined by the Soviet ability 
to retaliate against the American homeland.”50  This new development spurred 
an evolution in the strategy of forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe. 
 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY: TOWARD THE TRANSATLANTIC 
LINK 
With respect to Europe, the most salient aspect of deterrence as strategy 
has been extended deterrence.  Given that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union possessed nuclear weapons and the most probable battleground in a 
severe conflict between these countries was Europe, NATO strategy became 
focused on extending the U.S.-USSR nuclear stalemate to the situation in 
Europe.  Within this context, U.S. TNWs forward based in Europe reflected the 
heart and soul of extended deterrence.  According to David Yost in The US and 
Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, “During the Cold War, NATO Europe’s leaders 
generally agreed that a US nuclear presence on the ground was one of the 
requirements for a credible extended deterrence.”51  These weapons 
underpinned the U.S. nuclear guarantee for European security, and, in the eyes 
of many, continue to do so today. 
 
  
48 Leitenberg, “Background Materials in Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” 15.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response,  1. 
51 David S. Yost, “The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe,” Adelphi Paper 326 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 8. 
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1. Commitment and Credibility: The Condition of Coupling 
The central idea behind extended deterrence was that U.S. and European 
security were inextricably linked via the U.S. nuclear deterrence relationship with 
the Soviet Union—a situation known as coupling.  According to Ivo Daalder, in 
his book, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, 
It is this extension of stability that people have had in mind when 
they refer to the requirement of achieving a condition of ‘coupling’ 
between the United States and Western Europe.  NATO has sought 
to establish and maintain a condition of coupling through a strategy 
of extended deterrence—that is, using the extension of the threats 
that deter attack on the United States to deter attack on Western 
Europe.52
In other words, Europeans wanted to make sure that American commitments to 
respond with nuclear weapons, if required, to a Soviet attack on Europe were 
solid.  Some Europeans questioned whether the United States would risk 
“sacrificing New York to save Paris” even if the Soviets had not attacked the U.S. 
homeland.  Coupling the United States to Europe in this regard served to ease 
European concerns about extended deterrence.  Achieving a condition of 
coupling became a major factor in the evolution of the strategy of basing theater 
nuclear weapons in Europe because extended deterrence depended heavily on 
the credibility of the U.S. nuclear response and U.S. commitment to Europe.   
With respect to credibility and commitment, the debate within NATO 
emerged from two camps.  The first was concerned with the credibility of 
extended deterrence and constantly questioned the existence of coupling.  
Noting the strategic parity between the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals 
and the level of destructiveness associated with full-scale nuclear war, this camp 
questioned the credibility of a U.S. nuclear response to limited aggression.  If it 
was no longer feasible to use nuclear weapons in response to conflict at lower 
levels, then Europe would face instability at these levels.  This is the classic 
stability-instability paradox.   
 
52 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, 3. 
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The essence of this line of reasoning is reflected in former Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara’s comments: 
[The use of] strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet 
homeland would lead almost certainly to a response in kind that 
would inflict unacceptable damage on Europe and the Untied 
States—it would be an act of suicide.  The threat of such an action, 
therefore, has lost all credibility as a deterrent to Soviet 
conventional aggression.53
Consequently, U.S. policy makers favored strategies that raised the nuclear 
threshold to avoid nuclear entrapment.  Europeans, on the other hand, favored 
strategies that encouraged nuclear escalation in a conflict in order to avoid 
nuclear abandonment.  This disparity led many in the first camp to question the 
existence of coupling between the United States and Europe.  Achieving a 
condition of coupling held intrinsic value for those concerned with credibility 
because they viewed the NATO-Soviet relationship through a lens of immediate 
deterrence.  If Europe was to live on the edge of crisis, it needed a credible 
extended deterrence strategy. 
Those in the opposite camp concerned themselves not with a crisis of 
extended deterrence—indeed they saw the nuclear interdependence between 
the United States and the Soviet Union as a stabilizing factor at all levels of 
conflict—but rather with U.S. commitment to Europe.  In this view, the NATO-
Soviet relationship was based on a situation of general deterrence in which the 
existence of nuclear weapons on both sides was enough to deter.  In order to 
maintain that situation it was essential to ensure U.S. involvement in any 
potential European war.  To some, U.S. commitment was evident in shared 
political and economic ties as well as American national security interests.  To 
others, however, U.S. commitment had to be symbolized, and this could only be 
accomplished by basing U.S. forces and nuclear weapons in Europe.  As 
Lawrence Freedman explains,  if “existential  deterrence  is  to be extended, then  
 
53 Ibid., 5. 
the deterrent must be seen to exist.”54  Those concerned with U.S. commitment 
regarded these deployments as a necessary element to create a condition of 
coupling. 
 
2. Strategies of Extended Deterrence  
If achieving a condition of coupling through extended deterrence was to be 
the goal, the Allies needed an extended deterrent strategy that ensured both 
credibility and commitment.  This was no simple matter.  Disagreement existed 
within NATO over the various extended deterrence strategies and the role of 
TNWs. 
Four extended deterrence strategies emerged from differing perspectives 
on the nature of the threat of Soviet attack and the probability of nuclear 
escalation.  Daalder presents these perspectives as two dichotomies, “the Soviet 
threat is either high or low and nuclear escalation is either likely or it is not.”55  
The matrix in Figure 1 shows the relationship between the interaction of these 
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Figure 1.   Extended-Deterrence Strategies Within the Strategic Concept of 
Flexible Response (From Daalder)                                             
54 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, 9. 




                                           
The four strategies are defined as follows:
• Pure deterrence: The probability of attack is perceived as low and 
the probability of escalation as high.  The strategy emphasizes the 
likely catastrophe that will result if an attack should occur.  Because 
the threat is believed to be low, its acceptance of the inherent risk 
of total destruction should deterrence fail is deemed to be tolerable. 
• Conventional deterrence: Both the probability of attack and the 
probability of escalation are believed to be high.  The emphasis of 
the strategy is therefore on conventional defense in case of attack.  
Since the threat is assumed to be high, avoiding nuclear escalation 
becomes a key requirement of this strategy. 
• Escalatory deterrence:  The assumption is that both the Soviet 
threat and the probability of escalation are low.  Because an attack 
is assumed to be unlikely, relying on nuclear escalation to deter an 
attack is deemed tolerable, particularly since escalation can to 
some extent be controlled. 
• Warfighting deterrence: The Soviet threat is assumed to be high 
and the probability of escalation is perceived to be low.  Because 
an attack is seen as probable, attempting to defeat the opponent is 
deemed desirable.  Defeat can be accomplished by way of using 
nuclear weapons, since escalation can be controlled.57    
This discussion of extended deterrence strategy is important because it provides 
a context for understanding the strategic decisions and policy initiatives regarding 
forward basing of U.S. TNWs in Europe.  Developing a consensus on a single 
extended deterrence strategy proved difficult given the differing perspectives of 
not only credibility and commitment but how these relate to differing views on the 
nature of the Soviet threat and the likelihood of escalation.  These debates 
ultimately produced a strategy coherent enough to extend deterrence, yet 
ambiguous enough to ensure Alliance cohesion.   
 
3. Flexible Response and Alliance Cohesion  
The period from 1960 to 1967, a tumultuous period for NATO strategists, 
marked the beginning of a process in which TNWs were transformed from simply 
a military instrument of war to a political and military tool which fostered a 




                                           
underlying impetus for this transformation emerged from the debate outlined 
above.  Faced with the very real possibility of a two-sided nuclear conflict in 
which Europe would be caught in the middle, NATO planners began to rethink 
the strategic situation in Europe.  The United States promoted a new strategy of 
flexible response, which called for “the employment as appropriate of one or 
more of direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response, thus 
confronting the enemy with a credible threat of escalation in response to any type 
of aggression.”58  The proposal was hotly debated within NATO from 1962 to 
1967, when the newly established NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) finally 
adopted it.   
The essence of the flexible response strategy was that conventional 
defense should be the preferred means of defending Europe from the outset of 
war with the Soviet Union.  This reflected the belief that even the use of small 
nuclear armaments would inevitably lead to escalation and nuclear holocaust.  
Conventional forces would hold the line until either they were overrun by Soviet 
forces or the Soviets employed theater nuclear weapons.  From that point, 
NATO’s theater nuclear weapons would be employed, either in direct defense 
against Soviet conventional forces or as a “warning shot across the bow” to 
signal NATO’s intention to escalate the conflict if the Soviet Union chose to 
continue.  The final step on the escalation ladder would be a general strategic 
nuclear strike.  The connection of this final step to the strategy, with the 
implications it carried in terms of Soviet retaliation against the American 
homeland, codified the strategy of extended deterrence and created the condition 
of coupling between the United States and Western Europe. 
Although the NPG formally adopted the strategy of flexible response, this 
by no means meant there was complete agreement within NATO on 
implementation of the strategy.  Differences existed over how and when TNWs 
should be employed in a crisis.  These differences were reflected in the various 
strategies of extended deterrence—pure, conventional, escalatory and 
 
58 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, 2. 
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warfighting.  However, these disagreements over the implementation of flexible 
response existed within a larger political context, namely the Cold War itself.  As 
Morgan points out, “For years the Cold War was conducted as if we were on the 
edge of sliding into immediate deterrence…Immediate deterrence was the 
primary consideration, dominating most thinking even about general 
deterrence.”59  Within this context, however, Alliance cohesion stood as the 
dominant requirement.  Regardless of the different views over how and when 
TNWs should be employed in a crisis, the Alliance had to remain united if 
deterrence was to succeed.  Thus, “Flexible Response was a deliberately 
ambiguous strategic concept that encompassed rather than resolved differences 
over strategy,” yet “the ambiguous nature of Flexible Response was both 
necessary and sufficient to satisfy the overriding requirement of alliance 
cohesion.”60  From its inception through the end of the Cold War, flexible 
response marked a period in which the utility of forward basing theater nuclear 
weapons in Europe transitioned to be more political than military.  Instead of 
representing a military instrument of war, these weapons became a critical 




This chapter explored the rationale behind forward basing U.S. TNWs in 
Europe during the Cold War.  Given the perceived conventional imbalance after 
the Second World War, NATO relied on TNWs to provide a military solution to 
the problem of deterring Soviet aggression and defending Western Europe.  The 
massive retaliation strategy became untenable with the emergence of nuclear 
parity between the United States and the Soviet Union.  This development 
spurred an evolution in NATO strategy focused on extending deterrence to 
Europe.  Extended deterrence required a condition of coupling between U.S. and 
European security interests which could only be achieved through a credible U.S. 
 
59 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 10. 
60 Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response, 13. 
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nuclear response and a demonstrative U.S. commitment to Europe.  Forward 
basing TNWs in Europe satisfied these requirements and solidified the 
transatlantic link.  The ambiguity over when and how they would be used under 
flexible response masked the strategic debate over the various extended 
deterrence strategies in order to ensure Alliance cohesion.  Above all, the utility 
of these weapons, and thus the strategy of basing them in Europe, stemmed 
from the overarching belief that the Cold War existed within the context of an 
immediate deterrence relationship.   
The nature of this deterrence relationship changed significantly with the 
end of the Cold War, however the strategy did not.  The logic of extended 
deterrence and the condition of coupling created by forward basing U.S. TNWs in 
Europe became entrenched in NATO strategic thought.  In the contemporary 
security environment, both the United States and NATO as a whole cling to the 
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III. THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS: POLITICAL AND 
MILITARY UTILITY 
This chapter analyzes the political and military utility of TNWs today.  It 
explains why U.S. and European NATO policymakers support the continued 
deployment of TNWs in Europe.  The chapter examines U.S. conceptions of 
post-Cold War European security and deterrence beginning with the immediate 
post-Cold War force structure changes.  Next, it highlights the U.S. vision for 
TNWs in this new environment, including their role in counterproliferation, which 
emerges from the most recent National Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture 
Review.  The chapter then analyzes NATO’s support for basing U.S. TNWs in 
Europe.  It addresses NATO’s Strategic Concept and nuclear doctrine, NATO 
Enlargement, arguments for maintaining the transatlantic link through the 
continued deployment of TNWs in Europe and issues of nuclear assurance.  The 
chapter demonstrates that supporters of the TNW basing policy find political and 
military utility in these weapons not only for traditional deterrence, but also in a 
new operational capacity in counterproliferation.  The arguments presented in 
this chapter highlight one end of the contemporary debate on theater nuclear 
weapons in Europe examined by this thesis—that these weapons continue to 
have utility for European security in today’s strategic environment. 
 
A. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UTILITY OF TNWS 
For nearly sixty years the United States has relied on nuclear deterrence 
for national security.  The end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet 
Union marked a tremendous turning point for international security, yet while the 
strategic dynamics changed dramatically, U.S. perceptions of the political and 
military utility of TNWs did not.  Indeed, despite quantitative reductions, forward-
deployed U.S. TNWs continue to maintain their Cold War roles and have begun 
to take on new ones. 
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1. Presidential Nuclear Initiatives and Post-Cold War European 
Security 
In 1991 President George H. W. Bush astounded the world by presenting 
one of the most significant arms control and disarmament proposals in history.  
The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) entailed a major unilateral reduction in 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons and a challenge to the Soviet leadership to embark 
on reciprocal efforts.  These initiatives garnered acclaim from the international 
community, including British Prime Minister John Major who praised them as 
“bold…far-reaching, historic and imaginative.”61  The PNIs were not treaties, but 
rather specific disarmament pledges committing the U.S. and Soviet leaders to 
eliminate, remove and consolidate either all or portions of their TNW arsenals.  
Under the PNIs, all nuclear weapons of the respective countries’ ground forces 
were to be eliminated; all TNWs from ships, submarines and land-based naval 
aircraft were to be removed, with some eliminated and some centrally stored; 
some air force weapons were to be eliminated and others withdrawn to central 
storage facilities; and all Soviet nuclear air defense weapons were to be removed 
and some eliminated.62  In a 5 October speech to his nation, Soviet president 
Mikhail Gorbachev outlined his reciprocal response to President Bush’s 
initiatives, stating that “by taking unilateral and bilateral steps and holding 
negotiations, we push forward the process of disarmament…”63  Over the course 
of the 1990s, the two nations set about implementing the PNIs. 
The U.S. theater nuclear arsenal now stands at approximately 1,120 
weapons.  This number includes 800 B61 gravity bombs and 320 Tomahawk 
land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM/Ns), of which only 150 B61 gravity bombs 
remain forward deployed Europe.64  The Russian TNW arsenal, by contrast, 
totals approximately 3,380 weapons mixed between naval, air force and air  
61 Joshua Handler, “The 1991-1992 PNIs and the Elimination, Storage, and Security of 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emerging Threats in an Evolving 
Security Environment, ed. Brian Alexander, Alistair Millar, (Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2003), 20. 
62 Ibid., 21. 
63 Mikhail Gorbachev, “The USSR’s Disarmament Measures: The Elimination of Tactical 
Weapons,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 November 1991, iss. 58, no. 2, 37. 
64 “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2003,” NDRC Nuclear Notebook (July/August 2003). 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/mj03nukenote.html (accessed July 2004). 
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defense units.65  Table 1 compares U.S. and Soviet/Russian theater nuclear 
weapon totals from 1991 to 2002. 66
 
Table 1.   U.S. and Soviet/Russian TNW Totals (From Handler) 
 
U.S. and Soviet/Russian TNW Totals 
  1991 2002   
Estimated U.S. TNW      
Army/Marine Corps 3,040 0   
Navy 1,150 320 SLCMs 
Air Force 2,975 800 B-61 bombs 
Air Defense 0 0   
Total 7,165 1,120   
       
Estimated Soviet/Russian TNW      
Ground Forces  4,800- 6,700 0   
Navy  3,400- 5,000 640   
Air Force 4,000- 7,000 1,540   
Air Defense 2,800- 3,000 1,200   
Total 15,000-21,700 3,380   
 
While over three times the size of the U.S. arsenal, the Russian figure represents 
a dramatic decrease from the estimated 15,000-21,700 theater nuclear weapons 
deployed in the Soviet Union in 1991.  Progress on implementing the PNIs 
demonstrates concrete effort toward disarmament, yet the initiatives as a whole 
fall short of total elimination of theater nuclear weapons.  This reflects the 
continued value placed on these weapons and their deterrent effects for 
European security. 
President Bush’s proposed reductions in TNWs were a manifestation of 
the dramatic changes in international security at the dawn of the 1990s.  The fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War carried the promise of a new 
security situation in Europe.  However, by leaving some TNWs in Europe, U.S. 
policymakers also demonstrated caution.  In the uncertain post-Cold War world, 
deterrence still played a vital role.  Security analysts, including David Yost, 
                                            
65 Handler, “The 1991-1992 PNIs,” 31. 
66 Ibid. 
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highlighted developments in Russian nuclear doctrine and possible negative 
developments in Russian politics as a rationale for sustaining a U.S. nuclear 
presence in Europe.67  Russia’s apparently increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons to offset declining conventional capabilities and its abandonment of a 
no-first-use pledge made NATO continue its emphasis on nuclear deterrence.  
Moreover, troubling indicators of a possible departure from democratization and 
cooperation with the West toward a Russian dictatorship, civil war or, at the very 
least, political instability motivated the Allies “to retain U.S. nuclear forces in 
Europe as a hedge against the unknown.”68  The fall of the Soviet Union by no 
means assured that Europe was safe from aggression in the early post-Cold War 
years.  U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, although reduced in quantity, 
retained their historical political and military utility. 
By the dawn of the twenty-first century, the world witnessed the birth of a 
new strategic environment marked by the absence of conflict, or potential 
conflict, between great powers.  In place of great power conflict, global security 
management and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction now dominate 
the security agenda.  Here, attention focuses on rogue states seeking WMD for 
regional dominance or to counter perceived influence by the United States and 
its allies.69  The strategic environment is further complicated by the ever-
increasing possibility for mass-casualty terrorism.  Awareness of this potentiality 
was heightened by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, which exposed the world to the potential damage that could be inflicted 
through asymmetric means.  At a recent conference, Mohammed El Baradei, the 
head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, referred to threat of terrorists 
acquiring WMD materials as “a race against time.”70  Intelligence and security 
 
67 Yost, “The U.S. and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe,” 14-20. 
68 Ibid., 19. 
69 Andrew J. Goodpaster, C. Richard Nelson, and Seymour J. Deitchman, “Deterrence: An 
Overview,” Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1997), 
16. 
70 Mohammed El Baradei, “Remarks at the 2004 Carnegie International Nonproliferation 
Conference,” 21 June 2004, BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3827589.stm 
(accessed July 2004). 
37 
                                           
analysts, as well as government officials, agree that preventing the proliferation 
and use of WMD has become the highest priority in the twenty-first century 
security environment.   
As a result, U.S. defense planning is now oriented around the 
unpredictability of world politics.  As Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay 
portray in “A New Agenda for Nuclear Weapons,” “The United States continues 
to face an array of hostile enemies: potential rivals for global or regional 
leadership, rogue states hostile to U.S. interests, and terrorists implacably 
opposed to American values.  Moreover, the dynamic nature of world politics 
means that existing threats could escalate rapidly and new ones could 
materialize without warning.”71  In this new strategic environment, U.S. officials 
see continued political and military utility in TNWs. 
 
2. The National Security Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review and 
TNWs 
The dramatic events of September 11 had a profound effect on U.S. 
national security strategy.  The terrorist attacks instilled a feeling of vulnerability 
and a sense of urgency into the American psyche.  The Bush administration’s 
2002 National Security Strategy demonstrates this new outlook: 
But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and 
terrorists… the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, 
their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available 
only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood that 
they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s 
security environment more complex and dangerous…We must be 
prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they 
are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against 
the United States and our allies and friends.72
Recognizing U.S. vulnerability to WMD terrorism and the consequences of 
waiting for such an event to occur, the Bush administration adopted a preemptive 
 
71 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “A New Agenda for Nuclear Weapons,” Brookings 
Institution Policy Brief no. 94, 14 February 2002. 
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/pb94.pdf (accessed July 2004), 2. 
72 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
September 2002, 13. 
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strategy for national security.  In the now-famous words of the National Security 
Strategy, “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”73  It is important to distinguish here 
between preemption and prevention; these two concepts are often 
misunderstood and misrepresented.  Classical just war theorists, such as Hugo 
Grotius, described preventive war as using armed force “solely to eliminate an 
adversary’s ability to inflict future harm,” as opposed to preemptive war in which 
action is taken to prevent a future attack where the “danger was immediate and 
certain.”74  The Bush administration seeks to redefine the concepts of prevention 
and preemption.  The National Security Strategy states, “We must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries.”75  Under this new logic, according to Jason Ellis of the Center for 
Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University, “a preventive 
attack would be one undertaken to preclude a given actor from obtaining a 
particular weapons capability, while a preemptive attack would aim to degrade or 
destroy an existing capability.”76  Preemption here entails offensive action which 
may become necessary after proliferation has occurred to stop hostile 
adversaries armed with WMD from threatening to use or actually using these 
weapons.  In this context, these adversaries would pose an imminent threat to 
the United States, its forces, and its friends and allies. 
The ink on the document barely had time to dry before this new strategy 
was put into action.  The Bush administration’s insistence on dealing with Iraq’s 
perceived WMD threat, despite recently revealed intelligence flaws, 
demonstrates the powerful influence preemption now plays in U.S. foreign policy.  
As Michael Wheeler asserts in his chapter of Nuclear Issues in the Post-
September 11 Era, “It is impossible to overstate how important this conclusion 
 
73 Ibid., 15. 
74 Gregory Reichberg, “Preemptive War,” Commonweal, 30 January 2004, vol. 131, iss. 2, 
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75 National Security Strategy, 15. 
76 Jason D. Ellis, “The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security,” The 
Washington Quarterly (Spring 2003), vol. 26, iss. 2, 116. 
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[that preemption now plays a greater role in national security] is in driving 
American strategic thinking today.”77  The logic of preemption found its way into 
the new U.S. nuclear doctrine as well. 
Based on the complex and dynamic strategic environment and a new 
vision for national security, U.S. policymakers charted a new course for nuclear 
doctrine in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  In keeping with the force 
planning guidance laid down in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the 
NPR replaced old threat-based force planning calculations with a new 
capabilities-based approach.  Rather than maintain a nuclear force posture 
designed for Cold War deterrence, the NPR calls for a mix of nuclear and non-
nuclear capabilities designed to achieve specific policy goals.  According to 
National Nuclear Security Administration administrator, Linton Brooks, the NPR 
identifies four policy goals served by U.S. nuclear forces: assure, dissuade, deter 
and defeat.78
United States policymakers seek to assure friends and allies of U.S. 
commitment to them and the capability to follow through on that commitment 
across a broad range of contingencies.  The NPR postulates the role of nuclear 
weapons in assurance as: 
U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security 
partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats 
of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of 
surprising military developments. This assurance can serve to 
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weapons of their own to deter such threats and circumstances. 
Nuclear capabilities also assure the U.S. public that the United 
States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of 
U.S. weakness among potential adversaries.79
Assurance is not new in U.S. nuclear doctrine.  Indeed, as pointed out in Chapter 
II, assuring NATO Allies of U.S. commitment became a central feature in the 
development of the flexible response strategy.  In today’s strategic environment, 
assurance is perhaps even more important as a tool for nonproliferation.  
According to the NPR, U.S. TNWs deployed on the European continent remain 
“important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy.”80  For 
U.S. policymakers, maintaining TNWs in Europe demonstrates political utility in 
achieving the policy goal of assurance, just as it did during the Cold War. 
Policymakers also seek to dissuade potential adversaries from competing 
with U.S. capabilities through robust forces and infrastructure which they have no 
hope of matching.  The NPR states, 
U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be 
used to ‘dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs 
or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies 
and friends.’81  The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade 
existing weapon systems, surge production of weapons, or develop 
and field entirely new systems for the New Triad can discourage 
other countries from competing militarily with the United States.82
The concept of dissuasion dates back to nineteenth century European great-
power relations, yet it emerged only recently in American strategic doctrine.  
According to defense analyst Richard Kugler, “The United States does not have 
a great deal of experience with dissuasion because the Cold War led it to see the 
world in terms of friends and foes and to view its strategy choices in terms of 
assurance or deterrence.”83  Between assuring allies and deterring enemies, 
 
79 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts], 2002. 
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dissuasion offers a strategy for dealing with countries whose relationships vis-à-
vis the United States are marked by “cool peace, mutual suspicions, and 
common incentives to avoid violence.”84  For these relationships, U.S. 
policymakers envision political utility in TNWs, including those forward deployed 
in Europe, because these weapons make futile any attempts to threaten or 
coerce the Allies. 
Under the new NPR, U.S. nuclear forces will deter any threats that do 
arise by holding at risk the assets which a potential adversary values most.  
According to the NPR: 
Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of 
the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible 
military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD 
and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear 
capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States 
options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to 
achieve strategic and political objectives.85
Deterrence theory is well documented, the elements of which hinge on severe 
conflict, rationality, retaliatory threat, unacceptable damage, credibility and 
stability.86  Yet applying these principles in the new strategic environment poses 
a different set of challenges.  To meet these challenges, the NPR calls for 
greater flexibility with respect to nuclear forces and planning.  Deterrence now 
requires “nuclear attack options that vary in scale, scope and purpose” in order to 
“pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk 
and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult to discern than 
those of past adversaries.”87  For U.S. policymakers, this greater flexibility 
represents the utility of TNW today, including new weapons designed for hard 
and deeply buried targets (HDBT).  
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Finally, the NPR calls for the capability to decisively defeat any opponent 
in the event deterrence should fail.  Again, from the NPR: 
Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the 
strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the 
design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents 
decisively. …Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets 
able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for example, deep 
underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities).88
This is where “the rubber meets the road” for U.S. nuclear doctrine and 
preemption.  The NPR calls for the development of a new breed of smaller 
nuclear weapons with greater precision, lower yield, and greater penetration 
capability.  In short, the administration is pushing for more “usable” nuclear 
weapons which could be applied against targets inaccessible to current 
conventional weapons.  Combined with the recent trend toward preemption, 
these developments point to the emergence of a new role for TNWs in 
counterproliferation.   
 
3. Theater Nuclear Weapons in Counterproliferation 
Counterproliferation is not a new concept in U.S. security strategy.  
Indeed, the Department of Defense (DoD) has focused great attention on 
integrating counterproliferation capabilities into doctrine, training and equipment 
since the first Gulf War.89  What is new today, however, is the level of attention 
counterproliferation receives, due in large part to the events of September 11.  
From the creation of the Defense Department’s Counterproliferation Initiative 
(CPI) in 1993, the issue is now elevated to the presidential level with the U.S. 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.  Published in 2002, 
the administration’s WMD Strategy ties in closely with the National Security 
Strategy and the NPR with respect to the WMD threat and U.S. capabilities for 
dealing with that threat.   
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The strategy identifies three core pillars—counterproliferation, 
strengthened nonproliferation and consequence management.  While the latter 
two are important, according to a recent National Defense University report, 
counterproliferation has “now assumed a more prominent role.”90  This emerges 
from the realization that the proliferation and use of WMD now pose the greatest 
threat to the United States, its friends and allies.  Therefore, as the strategy 
states, “U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full 
range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of WMD by states 
and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and 
allies.”91  As in the past, the administration seeks to deter potential aggressors 
from developing or using WMD.  However, the strategy further stipulates the 
necessity to counter such threats preemptively, should deterrence fail.  It calls for 
“capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these 
weapons are used.”92  The U.S. strategy neither overtly stipulates that nuclear 
weapons will be used in a preemptive manner, nor does it rule out that very 
possibility.  Indeed, the issue is left deliberately ambiguous, in the same way that 
U.S. policymakers purposely leave the option of a nuclear response to other 
forms of WMD attack ambiguous in the minds of potential adversaries.  
According to John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, “If rogue states are not willing to follow the logic of 
nonproliferation norms, they must be prepared to face the logic of adverse 
consequences.  It is why we repeatedly caution that no option is off the table.”93  
According to an October 2002 report prepared for Congress, this constitutes a 
requirement for which the administration sees a role for TNWs: 
The Administration’s strategy outlines the need to react quickly to 
new intelligence and promptly target and deliver nuclear weapons 
 
90 Ibid., 17. 
91 The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 
2002, 2. 
92 Ibid., 3. 
93 John R. Bolton, “Remarks to the Conference of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
and the Fletcher School’s International Security Studies Program,” December 2, 2003. 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/26786.htm (accessed August 2004). 
44 
                                           
to emerging targets.  Non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed at 
bases overseas may be closer to the battlefield than strategic 
weapons based in the continental United States, and, therefore, 
may be able to respond more quickly. They also may carry fewer 
and smaller warheads than U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, which 
would make them better suited to discrete, precise attacks.94
To enhance the utility of these weapons, the Bush administration introduced four 
nuclear initiatives in its FY2004 budget request.  Based on the arguments put 
forward in the NPR, these initiatives called for lifting the congressional ban on 
low-yield nuclear weapons research and development; funding an Advanced 
Concepts Initiative (ACI) to begin studies on weapons technology and science; 
funding to study a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), which converts an 
existing bomb into a penetrating weapon; and funding to allow the United States 
the ability to conduct a nuclear test within 18 months of a presidential order 
(since 1996 the timeline has been 24-36 months).95  These initiatives, advocates 
argue, would increase the effectiveness of U.S. TNWs, thereby providing the 
president with low-yield, low-collateral-damage nuclear options for deterring and 
defeating WMD-armed opponents. 
From the end of the Cold War to the present, the U.S. policymakers have 
continually viewed TNWs as politically and militarily useful.  These weapons 
retained their Cold War roles of assuring allies and deterring nuclear aggression 
against U.S. or NATO territory, while gaining new roles in dissuading potential 
competitors and countering the proliferation of WMD.  According to 
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, “linking nuclear forces to multiple 
defense policy goals, and not simply to deterrence, recognizes that these 
forces…perform key missions in peacetime as well as in crisis or conflict.”96  In 
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counterproliferation, the most controversial role, the Bush administration values 
the political and military utility of TNWs as a more credible deterrent than 
strategic forces, and a pre-emptive tool for defeating potential WMD threats 
should deterrence fail.  Essentially, the new U.S. nuclear strategy represents a 
revival of warfighting deterrence, except instead of targeting the Soviet Union, 
the new strategy encompasses a broad array of threats. 
 
B. NATO AND THE UTILITY OF TNWS  
From the earliest days of the Cold War, NATO’s European members have 
generally viewed U.S. TNWs on their soil as a fundamental requirement for 
European security.  As Chapter II describes, NATO’s security depended on the 
credibility of the U.S. nuclear response, the U.S. commitment to Europe and 
coupling between U.S and European security interests.  Theater nuclear 
weapons ultimately provided the glue that solidified extended deterrence and the 
transatlantic link.  The disappearance of the Soviet, later Russian, threat had little 
effect on NATO’s perception of the utility of these weapons; they serve the same 
roles as in the past—deterrence and Alliance cohesion.  This section analyzes 
NATO’s support for continuing the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, addressing 
NATO’s Strategic Concept and nuclear doctrine, NATO Enlargement, arguments 
for maintaining the transatlantic link and issues of nuclear assurance. 
 
1. NATO’s Strategic Concept 
By early 1990, NATO recognized the gradual disappearance of the Cold 
War threat which U.S. nuclear weapons were originally intended to deter.  
Although it would be another two years before the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO 
leaders began to reevaluate issues of nuclear doctrine and strategy.  With the 
London Declaration, issued at the summit meeting of July 1990, NATO leaders 
foresaw the Alliance moving “to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear 
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forces truly weapons of last resort.”97  This new approach implied that NATO 
would no longer require its full complement of TNWs and, accordingly, spurred 
the introduction of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives.  NATO reduced its 
TNW arsenal by approximately 85 percent from 1991 to 1993, yet the political 
and military utility of the residual nuclear force remained firmly entrenched in 
NATO’s Strategic Concept.   
NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept recognized both continuity and change in 
the European security environment.  The Soviet Union, although in a state of 
domestic turmoil and disarray, continued to represent a very real threat to the 
Allies.  The Strategic Concept highlighted the requirement to view the risks and 
uncertainties of change in that country in light of the fact that the Soviets still 
possessed significant conventional military forces and nuclear forces comparable 
only to the United States.98  As in the past, NATO had to consider these 
capabilities in planning for security and stability in Europe.  Yet the Alliance also 
had to consider the effects of the dramatic changes occurring in Eastern and 
Central Europe.  NATO’s security was subject to the “adverse consequences of 
instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political 
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes” faced by these 
countries.99  The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated new southern periphery threats as 
well, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.  Emerging regional 
powers in these areas combined with new concerns about WMD and missile 
proliferation added to the diverse array of threats faced by NATO in the new 
security environment.  The Alliance formulated two conclusions from its analysis 
of the new security environment: first, “the new environment does not change the 
purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their 
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enduring validity;” second, that the “changed environment offers new 
opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to 
security.”  U.S. forward-based TNWs remained at the core of this new strategy. 
Although NATO’s conventional forces remained important for security and 
response to aggression, the Alliance held tightly to the utility of its nuclear 
weapons.  According to the Strategic Concept: 
The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is 
political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of 
war. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring 
uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the 
Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that 
aggression of any kind is not a rational option.100
Deterrence formed the bedrock of NATO’s nuclear doctrine.  Although the Soviet 
Union remained a primary area of concern for the Allies in the immediate post-
Cold War era, it no longer was the only one.  Under the 1991 Strategic Concept, 
NATO sought to deter any and all would-be aggressors.   
At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO officials released an 
updated version of the Strategic Concept.  This document essentially reiterated 
NATO’s previous position, that “The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of 
the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of 
war.”101  The fundamental difference between this Strategic Concept and the 
previous version is NATO’s perception of the security environment.  Whereas the 
1991 Strategic Concept highlighted the Soviet Union as a primary security 
concern, the new version states, “A strong, stable and enduring partnership 
between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-
Atlantic area.”102  Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal is still an area of concern for 
NATO, but this concern revolves more around safety and security issues of 
 
100 Ibid., para. 54. 
101 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, approved by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. 23-24 April 1999”, 
NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm (accessed 
August 2004), para. 62. 
102 Ibid., para. 36. 
48 
                                           
Russia’s crumbling nuclear complex than around deterring a Russian threat.  
NATO does not discount the possibility of a future deterrence relationship vis-à-
vis Russia, however unlikely, but the most recent Strategic Concept places 
greater emphasis on the growing threat of WMD proliferation and use.  The 1999 
Strategic Concept recognizes that “proliferation can occur despite efforts to 
prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, 
and forces.”103  The Allies defense posture, therefore, needed the capability to 
deal effectively and appropriately with this new threat, which included a role for 
NATO’s nuclear forces.  To NATO’s European members, however, the utility of 
these weapons has been and remains today essentially political—to deter 
aggression against the Alliance.  As David Yost asserts, European defense 
planners believe “U.S. nuclear forces in Europe send a more potent deterrent 
message about U.S. commitments than would be the case if the Alliance relied 
solely on U.S. weapons at sea and in North America.”104  The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and subsequent attention placed on potential WMD 
terrorism further emphasized, for NATO, the utility of its TNWs in this regard. 
 
2. NATO Enlargement 
In 1996, NATO defense ministers reiterated the fundamental purpose of 
Alliance nuclear doctrine established in the 1991 Strategic Concept.  However, in 
an attempt to reassure Moscow, the Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear 
Planning Group announced, “In the light of the changing security environment in 
Europe, NATO’s nuclear forces have been substantially reduced, they are no 
longer targeted against anyone and the readiness of NATO’s dual capable 
aircraft has been recently adapted.”105  As relations with Russia improved 
through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council) and Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace 
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program, NATO sought to enhance this cooperation by displaying a lower level of 
readiness to perform nuclear missions.  Yet these changes did not constitute 
abandonment, on the part of NATO, of the perceived utility of its nuclear 
weapons.  The communiqué claimed that “NATO’s current nuclear posture will, 
for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of the Alliance.”106  
NATO’s traditional view of the deterrent value of TNWs based in Europe 
remained strong. 
Efforts toward cooperation with Russia were particularly important as 
NATO embarked on the process of enlargement precisely because this process 
inevitably raised fears in Russia that U.S. TNWs could move even closer to its 
borders.  According the 1995 NATO enlargement study, “New members will be 
full members of the Alliance, enjoying all the rights and assuming all the 
obligations under the Washington Treaty.”107  The study further explains, “New 
members will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential 
role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention as set forth 
in the Strategic Concept.”108  While the study identified no requirement to station 
nuclear weapons in new members’ territories, it also reserved the right for NATO 
to modify its force structure “as circumstances warrant.”109  In short, NATO 
emphasized the utility its TNWs for Alliance security while it attempted to 
reassure Russia that these weapons posed no additional threat to its security. 
 
3. Preserving the Transatlantic Link 
NATO continues to value the utility of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in 
Alliance relations.  As in the past, NATO today recognizes that the supreme 
guarantee for European security is provided by the strategic nuclear forces in the 
United States.  As Chapter II demonstrates, U.S. TNWs during the Cold War 
tic link and coupled U.S. and European security  
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together under the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.  For European NATO, 
forward-based TNWs continue to serve this role: 
A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of 
Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention 
continue to require widespread participation by European Allies 
involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in 
peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in 
command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces 
based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential 
political and military link between the European and the North 
American members of the Alliance.110
U.S. TNWs offer a visible manifestation of extended deterrence, tangibly 
demonstrating the transatlantic link.  Without the U.S. nuclear presence in 
Europe, according to Yost, both potential adversaries and Americans might not 
take the nuclear promises as seriously.111  Beyond that, however, these 
weapons are thought to enhance Alliance cohesion through nuclear risk and 
burden sharing.  Countries accepting TNWs on their soil demonstrate solidarity 
by accepting the risks associated with them, including potential attacks on their 
territory aimed at destroying the weapons or the facilities they are stored in.  
These countries also share the burden of training for and potentially delivering 
these weapons in wartime.  Moreover, the forward-basing policy allows non-
nuclear-weapon states to play a role in Alliance decision making and nuclear 
policy implementation.  All Alliance members participating in NATO’s integrated 
military command structure (meaning all Allies except France) have a voice in the 
Nuclear Planning Group.  Without European risk and burden sharing, the fear in 
non-nuclear Europe is that the United States would be able to exert even greater 
influence over NATO’s nuclear doctrine.   
Finally, some analysts suggest that U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in 
Europe are useful as placeholders.  This argument views suggestions for 
adopting a “reconstitution” approach, in which U.S. TNWs could be reconstituted 
to the United States and brought back to Europe in case of emergency or crisis, 
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as “ill-founded.”112  Redeploying these weapons in a crisis, according to David 
Yost, could be construed as escalatory, perhaps even inviting a pre-emptive 
attack.  With respect to transatlantic relations, the reconstitution approach would 
be problematic because once the responsibility for risk and burden sharing is 
removed, it may be politically much more difficult, if not impossible, to convince 
the European public to accept nuclear weapons on their soil again.  Maintaining 
the strategy, on the other hand, prevents a potentially divisive debate within 
NATO and enhances Alliance cohesion, while making future weapons 
improvements politically easier.  For NATO, widespread participation in nuclear 
sharing and nuclear consultative arrangements through maintaining the U.S. 
nuclear presence in Europe is a necessity for preserving the transatlantic link, 
especially in light of recent tensions in the transatlantic relationship and U.S. 
conventional force structure reductions in Europe. 
 
4. Nuclear Assurance 
NATO places great value on the nuclear assurance role of its TNWs in 
promoting nonproliferation within the Alliance.  These weapons symbolize U.S. 
commitment to provide nuclear protection for its Allies, thereby reducing the 
incentive for individual states to develop nuclear weapons of their own.  
Withdrawing the U.S. nuclear presence could, in NATO’s view, signal 
disengagement which could trigger the pursuit of individual national nuclear 
weapons programs.  Analysts point to Germany and Turkey as the two most 
likely examples.   
For over fifty years, Germany has been satisfied under the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella.  Studies have shown, however, that under different security conditions 
Germany may show an interest in a national nuclear weapons capability.  David 
Yost highlights a 1995 survey of German political and civilian leaders which 
demonstrates, “It is the American presence on the Continent that allays most of 
Germany’s fears.  It is American nuclear weapons in Germany…that provide her 
with guarantees against nuclear threats and blackmail…[and that are] the key for  
112 Ibid., 58. 
52 
                                           
diluting both security and nonsecurity motivations for Germany to become a 
nuclear power.”113  No European country wants Germany to become a nuclear 
power, hence the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is useful in assuring Germany 
and preventing proliferation within NATO. 
Turkey, likewise, has depended on the U.S. nuclear guarantee and 
continues to do so.  Turkey’s geostrategic position vis-à-vis the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, as well as the tumultuous Middle East raises genuine security 
concerns.  As a result, Turkey’s commitment to non-nuclear weapon status under 
the NPT is highly dependent on NATO and the U.S. nuclear guarantee.  
According to Turkish Scholar Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “the extended deterrence of 
the United States must remain convincing and credible to Turks as well as to de 
facto and de jure nuclear weapons states and potential proliferators.”114  In the 
case of Turkey, like Germany and other NATO non-nuclear-weapons states, the 
assurances provided by U.S. TNWs in Europe enhance NATO’s non-proliferation 
goals, thus increasing the utility of these weapons for the Alliance. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzes the political and military utility of TNWs today.  It 
explains why U.S. and NATO policymakers support the continued deployment of 
TNWs in Europe.  U.S. policymakers support the TNW policy for traditional 
reasons as well as emerging roles.  The fall of the Soviet Union by no means 
assured that Europe was safe from aggression in the early post-Cold War years.  
U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, although reduced in quantity by the 
PNIs, retained their historical political and military utility.  In the twenty-first 
century strategic environment, U.S. officials see continued political and military 
utility in TNWs.  The new defense policy goals—assure, dissuade, deter and 
defeat—outlined in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, combined with the Bush 
administration’s doctrine of preemption and focus on counterproliferation laid out  
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in the National Security Strategy and National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, highlight the value U.S. policymakers place on the utility of 
these weapons today. 
NATO, as well, supports the continued deployment of TNWs in Europe 
based on traditional arguments for their utility in Alliance security.  From 1991 to 
1999, the Allies’ Strategic Concept emphasized their political utility in deterring 
any kind of war or coercion.  Although focused more on the volatile situation in 
the East in the early part of the decade, relations with Russia improved with time 
and a great deal of effort.  The Alliance offered reassurances to Russia regarding 
the status of its TNW arsenal and dual-capable aircraft readiness, yet at the 
same time it emphasized nuclear guarantees, roles and responsibilities to new 
members under the process of enlargement.  NATO’s nuclear doctrine today 
places greater emphasis on deterring threats posed by WMD proliferation and 
use.  Throughout this period, just as during the Cold War, NATO continued to 
place great value on U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to 
NATO, which “provide an essential political and military linkage between the 
European and the North American members of the Alliance.”115  For NATO, 
widespread participation in nuclear sharing and nuclear consultative 
arrangements is a necessity for preserving the transatlantic link.  These 
arrangements assure Allies of U.S. commitment and symbolize the credibility of 
extended deterrence which alleviates the potential for proliferation within the 
Alliance.  In terms of utility, then, NATO thinks politically while U.S. policymakers 
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IV. THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS: POLITICAL AND 
MILITARY RELEVANCE 
This chapter analyzes the political and military relevance of TNWs today.  
The chapter questions whether basing these weapons in Europe is necessary to 
maintain European security.  The chapter begins by identifying the nature of the 
transatlantic link as being primarily economic and political, with military links 
maintained via conventional forces.  Within this context, Europe and the United 
States remain coupled, and U.S. strategic nuclear forces still provide the 
supreme guarantee for European security.  The chapter then identifies a usability 
paradox wherein attempts to make TNWs more “usable” fail because issues of 
credibility and the “nuclear taboo” raise serious questions about their potential 
use.  Finally, the chapter addresses prospects for conventional deterrence, 
including the recent revolution in military affairs (RMA), NATO conventional 
superiority, conventional threats to rogue regimes, and the future of strategic 
strike.  Chapter three demonstrated arguments for TNW utility; the arguments 
presented in this chapter highlight another aspect of the contemporary debate on 
theater nuclear weapons in Europe examined by this thesis—that TNWs in 
Europe are irrelevant for European security today. 
 
A. THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK 
Proponents of basing U.S. TNWs in Europe argue that the policy must be 
continued in order to maintain the transatlantic link between the United States 
and Europe.  NATO’s Strategic Concepts, as well as subsequent NPG 
communiqués, repeatedly state that “Nuclear forces based in Europe and 
committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the 
European and the North American members of the Alliance.”116  As earlier 
chapters demonstrate, this rationale emerged during the Cold War and remains 
an integral aspect of NATO nuclear strategy today.  However, other analysts 
doubt that TNWs deployed in Europe are responsible for maintaining the 
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transatlantic link, claiming that economic and political ties bind the United States 
and Europe.  Moreover, the fact that new Alliance members receive the benefits 
of nuclear protection by joining NATO and participating in the Nuclear Planning 
Group demonstrates that allowing TNWs on a particular country’s soil is not a 
requirement a priori for extended deterrence.  Finally, U.S. conventional forces 
based in Europe symbolize American commitment to European security and link 
the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent to the protection of Europe.  This discussion 
demonstrates the irrelevance of TNWs based in Europe vis-à-vis the transatlantic 
link. 
 
1. Economic and Political Ties that Bind 
The United States has a vested interest in European security—this is 
nothing new.  The post-war reconstruction of Europe began in 1948 with the 
Marshall Plan, focusing on economic and political stability and prosperity as a 
precursor for security.  In the great ideological struggle between East and West, 
the United States and Europe were inextricably tied by their shared beliefs in 
liberal democracy and capitalism.  These beliefs were codified in the articles of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, along with the promise of collective defense found in 
Article Five.  As the strategic environment developed, European civilization itself 
depended on the United States as the ultimate guarantor of security.  Under the 
situation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the survival of Europe hinged on 
linking European security to the U.S. strategic nuclear response.  U.S. theater 
nuclear weapons based in Europe provided this transatlantic link. 
The old logic dictating that the transatlantic link must be maintained 
through U.S. TNWs stationed in Europe is exactly that—old logic.  Europe is no 
longer threatened by a massive Soviet invasion and the potential destruction of 
the continent by full-scale nuclear war.  Europe today faces threats to its 
economic and political stability and prosperity posed by WMD proliferation and 
terrorism.  Casualties from such an attack would be severe, to be sure, but would 
fall far short of annihilation of both European and American civilization.  The 
transatlantic link exists today not because of the approximately 150 U.S. gravity 
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bombs remaining in Europe117, but rather due to the fifty-plus years of economic 
and political interaction between Europe and the United States.  According to 
former Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Wesley Clark, Europe and 
the United States remain linked by an “enormous degree of economic 
interdependence” which is complemented and reinforced “by political, cultural, 
and diplomatic ties of long standing.”118  As General Clark points out, 
The figures speak volumes.  U.S. trade with Europe, amounting to 
over $250 billion annually, produces over three million domestic 
jobs.  U.S. companies employ three million people in Europe.  One 
in 12 factory workers in the United States is employed by a 
European Union (EU) firm operating in this country, of which there 
are some 4,000.  Half of the world’s goods are produced by the 
United States and the EU.  Ninety percent of humanitarian aid 
dispensed throughout the world comes from the United States and 
the EU.  Companies from the EU form the largest investment block 
in 41 US states.  Fifty-six percent of US foreign investment occurs 
in Europe.  Europe buys 30 percent of U.S. exports.  We should 
note too the large oil and gas reserves in the North Sea and 
particularly in the Caspian basin that provide a strategic hedge 
against disruption of supplies from the Middle East.119
This vast level of economic interdependence is supplemented by deep political 
integration as well.  As William Wallace asserts, “transatlantic relations are 
embedded in a dense network of multilateral links, including annual meetings of 
the Group of Eight major industrialized nations, semiannual consultations among 
top officials, and shared membership in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).”120  At the highest levels of state, the 
bond between the United States and Europe reaches beyond the military 
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At the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, President Bush articulated the point:  
We are committed to work toward world peace, and we're 
committed to a close and permanent partnership with the nations of 
Europe. The Atlantic Alliance is America's most important global 
relationship. We're tied to Europe by history; we are tied to Europe 
by the wars of liberty we have fought and won together. We're 
joined by broad ties of trade. And America is bound to Europe by 
the deepest convictions of our common culture -- our belief in the 
dignity of every life, and our belief in the power of conscience to 
move history.121
This vision of the transatlantic relationship suggests an extensive confluence of 
interests today which render the symbolic basing of a few hundred TNWs in 
Europe irrelevant.   
 
2. Nuclear Roles and Extended Deterrence 
Proponents of the TNW basing policy argue that widespread participation 
by European Allies in nuclear planning and roles, including accepting nuclear 
weapons on their territory, are a requirement for maintaining the transatlantic link.  
In this context, nuclear sharing enhances Alliance solidarity by ensuring that non-
nuclear members have a voice in nuclear planning issues.  According to Otfried 
Nassauer, director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, 
NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements have both political and technical 
mechanisms.122  The political mechanism involves consultation and cooperation 
between both nuclear and non-nuclear members through the Nuclear Planning 
Group.  This group discusses nuclear doctrine, strategy and policy and 
determines operational requirements for NATO’s nuclear force posture.  Since 
1979, the NPG has been open to all Alliance members participating in NATO’s 
integrated military command structure, and it serves as the “central political 
mechanism of nuclear sharing.”123   
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The technical mechanism of nuclear sharing involves the capability to 
perform nuclear missions.  Presently six non-nuclear NATO members have the 
capability to deliver U.S. TNWs via nationally-owned, dual-capable aircraft.  
According to Nassauer, these countries include Air Force units in Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.124  France and Canada 
previously maintained such programs, but have since ended their participation—
Canada did so in 1989.  The remaining “traditional” NATO members participate 
only on the political side of nuclear sharing and reject the deployment of U.S. 
TNWs on their soil.  NATO’s new members joining the Alliance under the process 
of Enlargement participate in nuclear sharing only through the political 
mechanisms as well.  In the case of the new members, this arrangement 
emerged from NATO’s politically-binding pledges in the 1997 NATO-Russia 
Founding Charter that 1) no nuclear weapons would be deployed in the new 
states; 2) no infrastructure for the deployment of nuclear weapons will be 
maintained; and 3) NATO will not build infrastructure for the deployment of 
nuclear weapons in the new states.125  Furthermore, Secretary of State Albright 
and Defense Secretary Cohen testified before Congress in 1997 that the Alliance 
has no plans to train pilots in the new member states for nuclear mission, provide 
dual-capable aircraft to these states or demand them to acquire such aircraft, or 
foment Programs of Cooperation with new members.126  Interestingly, this 
disparate participation in the technical side of nuclear sharing has no impact on 
extended deterrence vis-à-vis the new members. 
Nuclear deterrence within the NATO construct equally protects all 
members of the Alliance regardless of whether their role in nuclear sharing is 
political or technical.  As Nassauer points out, “It is neither dependent on a 
member state’s possession or storage of nuclear weapons on its soil nor on its 
capability to launch them in case of war.”127  This fact was reaffirmed for the new 
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members in NATO’s enlargement study and subsequent agreements with 
Moscow.  NATO members continue to influence Alliance nuclear policy through 
participation in the NPG, exemplified by Canada’s experience after giving up its 
nuclear-delivery capability in 1989.  The conclusion to draw from this discussion 
of nuclear roles in NATO is that extended deterrence remains intact through a 
transatlantic link embodied by NATO’s institutionalized political arrangements.  
U.S. TNWs based on European soil are irrelevant in this regard. 
 
3. Strategic Nuclear Forces 
Throughout the history of the Atlantic Alliance, Europe consistently sought 
security under the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella.  NATO argues that forward 
deployed U.S. TNWs provide the essential linkage to these U.S. strategic nuclear 
forces.  This argument, however, harkens back to the Cold War flexible response 
strategy in which the decision to use nuclear weapons would have occurred early 
in a conflict.  An early decision on the use of TNWs was deemed necessary to 
support direct defense of Alliance territory or a step up the escalation ladder 
toward nuclear war at the strategic level.  The U.S. nuclear umbrella today, 
however, is much less “automatic.”128  Indeed, NATO’s Strategic Concept now 
suggests that “the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might 
have to be contemplated by them are…extremely remote.”129  So remote, in fact, 
that readiness levels for NATO’s dual-capable aircraft are now measured in 
months versus minutes and hours.130  The rationale behind this posture 
emanates from NATO’s vastly improved conventional defense capability.  
Notwithstanding recent European efforts at transformation, NATO’s superior 
conventional capability resides with the U.S. conventional forces based in Europe 
and available for NATO defense.  U.S. forces are fully integrated into NATO’s 
military command structure from the tactical level to the strategic level, 
culminating with an American military officer serving as the Supreme Allied 
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Commander Europe.  U.S. commitment to European security is demonstrated 
through the continued deployment of these forces; given the importance of 
Europe to U.S. national security, this deployment is unlikely to end anytime soon.  
As President Bush said in Prague, “And nations in the family of NATO, old or 
new, know this: Anyone who would choose you for an enemy also chooses us for 
an enemy. Never again in the face of aggression will you stand alone.”131  
Moreover, any assertion that removing U.S. TNWs from Europe would mean also 
removing U.S. conventional forces is simply false.  Europe is currently the only 
place in the world where the United States stations both conventional and 
nuclear forces.  Past reconstitution policies, in Japan and Korea, left U.S. 
conventional forces in place, and there is little indication that such a move in 
Europe would be any different.  “In other words,” according to Nassauer, “the 
presence of U.S. troops does not depend on the simultaneous presence of 
nuclear weapons.”132  Although NATO’s conventional superiority effectively 
removed the requirement for TNWs to be used early in a conflict, the Alliance still 
relies on nuclear deterrence for WMD threats. 
Today, according to NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, “The supreme 
guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces 
of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States.”133  This means that U.S. 
strategic forces, available for Alliance collective defense under Article V of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, serve to preserve the peace and prevent coercion.  In 
addition to the obligations under Article V, the U.S. strategic arsenal is further 
linked to Europe through conventional force deployments.  As the newest U.S. 
Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction asserts, “The full 
range of operational capabilities will be required to counter the threat and use of 
WMD by states and non-state actors against the United States, our military 
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forces, and friends and allies.”134  Conventional deployments in Europe not only 
symbolize U.S. commitment to European security, they also enhance the 
credibility of nuclear deterrence since a nuclear attack on Europe would most 
assuredly affect American forces stationed there.  Even if TNWs were withdrawn 
from Europe, the United States would maintain a strategic nuclear response 
option.  Given the readiness status of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft, such an 
option, carried out with strategic bombers or Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs), would provide greater operational flexibility.  In this context, a strategic 
strike, utilizing a low-yield warhead provides the same, if not greater utility than a 
gravity bomb dropped from a tactical aircraft based in Europe.  The latter 
becomes irrelevant for European security. 
The nature of the transatlantic link today is primarily economic and 
political, with military links maintained via conventional forces.  The United States 
and Europe are intricately bound by an enormous degree of economic 
interdependence and a complex network of institutional arrangements.  Within 
this context, Europe and the United States remain coupled in ways far beyond 
the symbolic basing of U.S. theater nuclear weapons.  Moreover, NATO’s 
technical nuclear sharing arrangements are no longer required to extend 
deterrence, as demonstrated by the nuclear guarantees provided under 
enlargement.  NATO members continue to participate in nuclear policy decision 
making through the political mechanisms in the Nuclear Planning Group and the 
requirement for consensus in NATO decision-making.  Finally, American 
conventional deployments, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty itself, link the U.S. 
strategic umbrella to European defense, providing equal or greater utility than 
forward deployed TNWs.  As Harold Müller succinctly states, “Anyone who 
currently believes that the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance hinges on the 
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continued symbolism of yesteryear holds alliance cohesion in very low regard 
indeed.”135  In terms of maintaining the transatlantic link, TNWs are irrelevant. 
 
B. THE USABILITY PARADOX 
Theater nuclear weapons based in Europe may also be seen as irrelevant 
from the standpoint of credibility and the “nuclear taboo.”  To be credible, the 
target must believe the deterrer has the will to carry out its threats.  According to 
deterrence scholar Patrick Morgan, “Threat credibility and effectiveness also 
depend on the perceived legitimacy of the means.”136  Given the long-standing 
“nuclear taboo” and the very real political consequences of using nuclear 
weapons, especially in a preemptive manner, the likelihood of a U.S. president 
choosing to employ TNWs is remote.  Efforts to make TNWs more “usable,” such 
as the current feasibility studies of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator or “bunker 
buster,” may enhance the capabilities of TNWs, but will do little to alleviate the 
taboo against their use.  From this standpoint, these weapons offer no real 
credibility advantage over low-yield strategic nuclear forces, and pose a far less 
credible threat than modern conventional forces.  The following discussion 
highlights the issues of credibility underlying current efforts to make nuclear 
weapons more “usable,” and then demonstrates why these efforts are irrelevant 
in light of the nuclear taboo. 
 
1. Issues of Credibility 
Credibility has been a fundamental issue throughout the history of nuclear 
deterrence.  Successful deterrence relied on credibility because, as Morgan 
states, “it was not a state’s capacity to do harm that enabled it to practice 
deterrence, it was others’ belief that it had such a capacity.  What deterred was 
not the threat but that it was believed.”137  To make the threat believable, the 
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deterrer needed the capability to inflict unacceptable damage and to convince the 
opponent the deterrer had the will to do so.  With respect to capability, the 
deterrer needed only to make his capabilities known to potential aggressors.  
Will, however, was inherently more difficult to demonstrate.  Communicating 
intent was very important in demonstrating commitment to carry out the threat of 
retaliation.  During the Cold War, extended deterrence hinged on the credibility of 
NATO’s threat to use TNWs either in direct defense or to escalate the conflict.  
With the security environment no longer controlled by the situation of MAD, Bush 
administration officials view credibility today differently. 
From the late 1990s, many strategic analysts—now members of the 
current administration—began to rethink issues of credibility.  As proliferation and 
possible use of WMD dominated the security agenda, these analysts addressed 
the “question of whether U.S. nuclear policy and forces (type and mix) provide 
credible deterrent against these emerging threats.”138  This report coincided with 
the trend toward a capabilities-based approach to U.S. defense planning put forth 
in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.  The result was a shift in nuclear policy 
recommendations toward enhancing credibility by improving capability.  Simply 
stating that U.S. nuclear weapons are a deterrent for WMD was no longer 
enough.  In what is widely considered the blueprint for the 2002 NPR, the 
National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) published a report entitled, Rationale 
and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control.  The NIPP report 
asserted, 
Nuclear weapons can also be used in counterforce attacks that are 
intended to neutralize enemy military capabilities, especially 
nuclear and other WMD forces. The purpose of a counterforce 
strategy is to deter aggression, coerce compliance, and limit the 
damage that enemy forces can inflict.139
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Counterproliferation became the main focus of U.S. nuclear strategy, and more 
“usable” nuclear weapons became the means.  Officials identified the capability 
to defeat mobile systems and hardened WMD storage facilities and command 
bunkers as a requirement for deterrence.  This capability exists with the B61-11, 
which was fully deployed to Europe in 1998, however the penetration capability is 
estimated to be only about twenty feet.140  In order to improve nuclear weapons 
capabilities, the administration’s new nuclear initiatives call for studies on 
advanced concepts and the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.  If successful, 
these studies could produce new nuclear weapons designed to provide the 
president with low-yield, low-collateral-damage nuclear options for deterring and 
defeating WMD-armed opponents.  Given the military penchant for having its 
most capable weapons “at the pointy end of the spear,” it is highly likely that the 
United States will seek to deploy these weapons in Europe, just as it did with the 
B61-11.  In theory, these new nuclear capabilities will enhance deterrence, yet 
such efforts fail to address the second aspect of credibility—the will to use them. 
 
2. The Nuclear Taboo 
Making nuclear weapons more “usable” through improved capabilities 
does not necessarily increase the decision-maker’s willingness to use them.  The 
issues surrounding the decision to employ nuclear weapons are complex; 
probability of kill and reducing collateral damage, radiation fallout and 
unnecessary suffering are only part of the equation.  The domestic and 
international political consequences of the decision to use nuclear weapons, 
especially in a pre-emptive counterproliferation role, profoundly affect the 
decision-maker’s willingness to do so.  The decision to employ nuclear weapons 
would constitute a violation of the near sixty-year-old “nuclear taboo.” 
The nuclear taboo is not a new phenomenon in the discourse on nuclear 
strategy, yet with each passing year it grows stronger.  According to T. V. Paul, 
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the term refers to “an unwritten and uncodified prohibitionary norm against 
nuclear use.”141  The nuclear taboo developed from the massive destructive 
power of these weapons.  This potential for total destruction led states to 
consider their use only when national survival was at stake.  To do otherwise 
would most assuredly bring long-term condemnation, regardless of the tactical or 
strategic advantages the state might gain.  The historical evidence clearly 
demonstrates the power of the nuclear taboo. 
Since nuclear weapons emerged on the international scene in 1945, no 
state has broken the taboo against their use.  Despite their diversity and intense 
security situations, the nuclear powers—United States, Russia, United Kingdom, 
France, China, India, Pakistan and, reportedly, Israel—have found no reason to 
employ their nuclear arsenals.  This implies, according to Paul, a global 
“recognition that nuclear weapons are unusable across much of the range of 
traditional military and political interests.”142  The United States was unwilling to 
use them in Korea and Vietnam, even though they could have contributed to 
military victory.  The Soviets, and later Russians, also refrained from using 
nuclear weapons in Afghanistan and Chechnya.  With each non-use decision, the 
norm against employing nuclear weapons grows stronger. 
The normative basis for the nuclear taboo is supported by legal arguments 
as well.  Provisions outlined under the laws of armed conflict govern U.S. 
decision making and are reflected in U.S. nuclear doctrine.  The U.S. manual, 
Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear Operations, clearly states, 
However, to comply with the law, a particular use of any weapon 
must satisfy the long-standing targeting rules of military necessity, 
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unnecessary suffering.  Nuclear weapons are unique in this 
analysis only in their greater destructive potential…In some 
circumstances, the use of a nuclear weapon may therefore be 
inappropriate.143
This portends a great degree of caution for decision-makers contemplating 
crossing the nuclear threshold.  Moreover, the United States, Great Britain and 
France have made conditional pledges not to use nuclear weapons against 
signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.144  Such international legal 
considerations give nuclear-weapons states added reason to recognize the taboo 
against nuclear use. 
The point of this discussion is that the nuclear taboo plays a very real role 
in determining a decision-maker’s willingness to actually use nuclear weapons.  
In addition to rejecting international norms and potentially violating international 
law, the decision to employ nuclear weapons would undermine U.S. global moral 
leadership.  Any U.S. president would likely be very hesitant to make such a 
decision.  This applies to a decision to use any nuclear weapon—whether theater 
or strategic, forward deployed or launched from the United States—the nuclear 
taboo relates simply to crossing the nuclear threshold.  Secretary of State Colin 
Powel made this point clear with regard to theater nuclear weapons in Europe: 
"No matter how small these nuclear payloads were, we would be crossing a 
threshold. Using nukes at this point would mark one of the most significant 
political and military decisions since Hiroshima."145  The significance increases 
with the prospect of using TNWs in a pre-emptive counterproliferation role.  
Improved nuclear weapons may “lower the nuclear threshold” as some argue, but 
they will not remove it.  Moreover, the decision to use nuclear weapons 
preemptively is highly dependent on accurate intelligence information.  If the 
intelligence is wrong, as it appears to have been in the recent Iraq war, U.S. 
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leadership would not only violate the nuclear taboo, it would do so without 
justification.  Such an outcome could entail irreparable damage to U.S. credibility 
and decrease national security in the long run.   
The reality is that forward deployed TNWs pose no more credible threat 
than low-yield ICBMs or bombers based in the United States in terms of 
willingness to cross the nuclear threshold.  This is especially true in Europe 
where, according to Stanley Sloan, “It is also uncertain whether America’s 
European allies would allow the United States to use its Europe-based weapons 
for any purpose other than deterrence or defense of the Alliance.”146  Since these 
functions are provided by conventional forces and the U.S. strategic nuclear 
arsenal, TNWs deployed in Europe are irrelevant for maintaining security on that 
continent. 
 
C. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE 
The United States, and by extension, NATO, possess the world’s most 
capable conventional forces today.  In the eyes of the military, conventional 
deterrence may be more effective than deterrence based on theater nuclear 
weapons.  Supporters of a conventional deterrence strategy argue its merits 
based on military and political utility—in other words, what conventional forces 
can accomplish and how these capabilities affect adversaries’ decision-making.  
This section addresses prospects for conventional deterrence, including the 
recent revolution in military affairs (RMA), conventional threats to rogue regimes 
and the future of strategic strike.   
 
1. The RMA and Conventional Combat Power 
Deterrence, as noted earlier, is a function of capability and will.  With 
respect to capability, modern conventional forces bring to bear vastly improved 
combat power owing in large part to the most recent revolution in military affairs.  
The technological advances in surveillance, information, and precision along with 
requisite investments in these capabilities have created “sophisticated 
 
146 Sloan, “NATO Nuclear Strategy Beyond the Cold War,” 50.  
69 
                                           
nonnuclear weapons [that] can now hold at risk those assets most highly valued 
by potential aggressors…”147  Understanding the RMA and its implications for 
conventional combat power is key to understanding why modern conventional 
forces make TNWs irrelevant today. 
According to Rand researcher Richard Hundley, “An RMA involves a 
paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either 
renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant 
player, or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension 
of warfare, or both.”148  Military historians have characterized developments such 
as the longbow, machine gun, blitzkrieg, carrier warfare and nuclear weapons as 
examples of an RMA.  They most often result from technological advances, or 
rather a combination of technological advances, which lead to profound changes 
in the nature of warfare.  Successful technological RMAs combine advances in 
technology with innovative doctrine and organizational change to exploit that new 
technology.  Although experts debate whether the current military-technological 
revolution constitutes an RMA, it appears that advances in precision weaponry 
and information combined with doctrinal and organizational efforts in defense 
transformation demonstrate this to be the case.   
Precision weaponry combined with advances in command, control, 
communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) during 
the 1991 Gulf War to produce devastating effects on Iraq’s military and 
infrastructure.  That war demonstrated unequivocally the capabilities of modern 
conventional military forces both in terms of battlefield operations and strategic 
strike.  Since that time, U.S. conventional weapons have greatly improved, both 
in their operational utility on the battlefield and capacity to hold specific classes of 
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targets at risk.149  Table 2 highlights the conventional penetrating weapons 
capability currently found in the U.S. inventory.150
 
Table 2.   Conventional Earth Penetrators in the Current U.S. Arsenal (From 
Levi) 
 
Earth Penetrator Length Penetration Abilities 
BLU-109 8 feet More than 6 feet of reinforced concrete 
BLU-113 19 feet More than 20 feet of concrete and more than 100 feet of earth 
BLU-116 8 feet More than 12 feet of reinforced concrete and more than 50 feet of earth; can survive impact in hard rock 
 
According to a recent research report published by Air University, “The U.S. is 
now on the threshold of new conventional weapons technology which hold 
hardened and deeply buried targets at risk, as well as smart weapons that loiter 
over battle lines and target massed hostile forces. These target sets could only 
be previously destroyed using nuclear weapons.”151  These capabilities are being 
integrated into U.S. doctrine and force structure through defense transformation.  
As the Director, Force Transformation, Vice Admiral Cebrowski states, “The 
Department seeks to ensure that changes occur not only in the operating 
concepts we develop and the systems we acquire but also in our military culture 
and the processes that drive investment decisions.”152  The recent experiences 
in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that defense transformation efforts are 
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beginning to bear fruit.  In a December 2003 interview, Vice Admiral Cebrowski 
touted the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom as indicative of “the way 
not just modern technology is taking hold, but more importantly, how information-
age doctrine and organization are taking hold."153  The crossroads between 
technology and transformation point to the existence of an RMA in conventional 
combat power, through which capabilities now exist to perform missions and 
roles previously envisioned for TNWs.  From this standpoint, capabilities for 
conventional deterrence render theater nuclear weapons irrelevant. 
For NATO, this translates into a reversal of the Cold War conventional 
imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union.  If—and this seems highly unlikely given 
the post-Cold War security relationship with Russia—a future aggressive Russia 
threatened Europe, NATO would hold the advantage in conventional superiority.  
In the unlikely event that Russia signaled its intention to escalate the conflict with 
TNWs, the supreme guarantee of European security would still be found in the 
U.S. strategic arsenal.  U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe are no longer 
required to offset Russian conventional military power; they are irrelevant as a 
deterrent threat. 
 
2. Rationality, Retaliation, and Unbearable Damage: Threatening 
Regime Survival 
With respect to rogue states and proliferators, the concepts of rationality, 
retaliatory threat and unbearable damage point to holding at stake what these 
states value most—regime survival.  A distinction arises here between 
“unacceptable” and “unbearable” damage.154  While massive nuclear punishment 
may be unacceptable to the leader of a rogue regime, it may not be unbearable if 
the regime survives.  The best way to deter proliferation and use of WMD by 
these regimes, according to Morgan, “is not by threatening a massive WMD 
response…but by being able to threaten destruction of the leaders and regime 
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with conventional forces...”155  In this way, deterring the proliferation and use of 
WMD is feasible, and the credibility of the deterrence is enhanced by keeping the 
retaliatory threat below the nuclear threshold.   
The assumption of rationality is a fundamental principle in the 
development of deterrence theory.  Indeed, the very essence of deterrence 
presumes rational decision making by both the deterrer and challenger.  In this 
context, rationality is defined as gaining information about the situation and one’s 
options for dealing with it, calculating the costs and benefits of those options and 
their probabilities of success or failure, and then choosing a course of action 
aimed at achieving the greatest gain or the minimum loss.156  As Morgan asserts, 
deterrence “was not threatening an opponent so that he would behave; it was 
conscious, calculated threats to adjust the challengers’ cost-benefit calculations 
so he saw attacking as nonoptimal.”157  While the assumption of rationality poses 
difficulties for deterrence theory and strategy, particularly in situations where 
deterrence has failed ostensibly due to irrationality, it remains an important 
element because regardless of whether actors are rational or act rational based 
on real preferences and perceptions in deterrence situations, the success of 
deterrence as strategy is based on rational outcomes.  With respect to rationality, 
conventional forces pose a much more credible deterrent because they have the 
capability to destroy that which an adversary values most and the deterrer is 
much more likely to use them than nuclear forces. 
Another fundamental principle of deterrence theory is the concept of a 
retaliatory threat.  The idea here is linked closely to the notion of severe conflict, 
in that deterrence focuses on preventing war.  Prevention, according to Morgan, 
“was to be achieved via manipulating the opponent’s thinking, making deterrence 
a psychological relationship.”158  Faced with the destructive power of nuclear 
weapons, the goal became to convince the opponent that an attack would not 
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necessarily be met with defense, since defense in nuclear war was viewed as 
impossible, but rather with retaliation.  The attacker could expect to be punished 
in kind for aggression.  With nuclear weapons, this equated to the destruction 
and collapse of the attacker’s society.  Rogue leaders are much more concerned 
with the survival of their regimes and military capabilities.  Here, conventional 
forces pose a more credible retaliatory threat because they would be used to 
target exactly those areas.  This is all the more important given U.S. desires to 
be seen as a liberator of societies repressed by rogue regimes.  The collateral 
damage associated with the use of even low-yield TNWs certainly does little to 
enhance such a reputation.   
Related to the retaliatory threat is the principle of unacceptable damage.  
The question here is how much punishment is enough to deter?  The answer to 
this question stems from the assumption of rationality.  Essentially, the 
punishment required to deter attack must be sufficient to convince the attacker 
that the costs of attacking outweigh the benefits, thus making the attack appear 
not to be in the attacker’s best interests.  In the past it was relatively easy to 
assume the prospective punishment—destruction of the attacker’s society—
constituted unacceptable damage.  Today however, deterrence is predicated on 
an understanding of the opponent’s cost-benefit calculations and what that 
opponent values.  Since rogues value regime survival, destruction of their society 
may be unacceptable, but not unbearable if the regime survives.  Conventional 
forces today have the capability to destroy the regime without destroying the 
society.  By threatening unbearable damage in the form of regime survival, 
conventional forces again provide a much more credible deterrent than low-yield 
TNWs. 
This theoretical discussion highlights the value of conventional deterrence 
in today’s strategic environment.  If the goal is to deter rogue states and 
proliferators from threatening to use or using WMD, then deterrence must hold at 
risk that which these adversaries value most—regime survival.  Based on the 
principles of rationality, retaliation and unbearable damage, conventional 
deterrence presents greater prospects for success than deterrence based on 
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TNWs.  Moreover, should deterrence fail in a given conflict, decision-makers 
would be more likely to carry out their conventional threats.  While no responsible 
government wants to go to war, such a situation would serve to reinforce the 
deterrent in the minds of future adversarial regimes.  The capabilities of 
conventional forces and a decision-maker’s increased willingness to use them 
over nuclear options to threaten regime survival demonstrate the irrelevance of 
TNWs today. 
 
3. The Future of Strategic Strike 
While the United States, and by extension, NATO, possess the world’s 
most capable conventional forces today, conventional deterrence will only be 
enhanced by future developments in strategic strike.  According to the recently 
released Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic 
Strike Forces, the objective for strategic strike is: “To provide future Presidents 
an integrated, flexible, and highly reliable set of strike options with today’s 
tactical-level flexibility but on a global scale.”159  The Task Force recommends 
sweeping changes in U.S. strategic strike capability, particularly in conventional 
weapons. 
The recommendation for the Air Force to retain fifty Peacekeeper ICBMs 
and convert them to carry conventional warheads would provide a thirty-minute 
response capability for worldwide strategic strike.160  This, along with other 
recommendations such as a new non-nuclear ballistic missile launched from the 
Navy’s cruise-missile submarine assets, will provide an enhanced, credible, 
conventional deterrent backed up by improved strategic nuclear forces.161  From 
its comprehensive analysis of strategic strike, the Task Force recommends 
eliminating the role of TNWs delivered by deployed dual-capable aircraft; the 
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report asserts: “There is no obvious military need for these systems…”162  In the 
military context, as in the political, theater nuclear weapons based in Europe are 
now irrelevant, and will become even more so in the future. 
The most recent revolution in military affairs has provided the United 
States and NATO an unprecedented superiority in conventional forces.  These 
modern forces not only can dominate on the battlefield, they now increasingly 
possess some capability to hold hard and difficult targets at risk in deterrence.  
Such a capability enables decision-makers to more credibly threaten regime 
survival in deterring the proliferation and use of WMD because conventional 
deterrence today is more effective vis-à-vis rationality, retaliation and unbearable 
damage.  Prospects for conventional deterrence will only improve as new 
concepts for the future of strategic strike come on line.  In light of these factors, 
U.S. TNWs forward deployed in Europe become irrelevant. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed the political and military relevance of TNWs today.  
The nature of the transatlantic link is primarily economic and political, with 
military links maintained via conventional forces.  Economic interdependence and 
dense institutional arrangements couple the United States and Europe in ways 
far beyond the symbolic basing of U.S. theater nuclear weapons.  Without these 
weapons, NATO members would continue to participate in nuclear policy 
decision making through the political mechanisms in the Nuclear Planning Group 
and the requirement for consensus in NATO decision-making.  American 
conventional deployments, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty itself, link the U.S. 
strategic umbrella to European defense, providing equal or greater utility than 
forward deployed TNWs.   
Theater nuclear weapons based in Europe may also be seen as irrelevant 
from the standpoint of credibility and the nuclear taboo.  Efforts to make TNWs 
more “usable,” such as the current feasibility studies of a Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator or “bunker buster,” may enhance the capabilities of TNWs, but will do  
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little to alleviate the taboo against their use.  From this standpoint, these 
weapons offer no real credibility advantage over low-yield strategic nuclear 
forces, and pose a far less credible threat than modern conventional forces.   
Conventional deterrence, by contrast, may be more effective than 
deterrence based on theater nuclear weapons.  Modern conventional forces not 
only can dominate on the battlefield, they now increasingly possess some 
capability to hold hard and difficult targets at risk in deterring the proliferation and 
use of WMD.  As congressional research analyst Jonathan Medalia points out, 
“U.S. forces demonstrated the ability of ground troops to attack tunnel complexes 
in Afghanistan and the ability of precision conventional ordnance to destroy 
underground bunkers in Iraq. It would be better, in this view, to spend funds on 
improving the ability to destroy these targets with conventional means rather than 
on nuclear weapons.”163  Conventional deterrence enables the United States to 
more credibly threaten what rogue leaders value most—regime survival—and 
this capability will only improve in the future.  This chapter demonstrates that the 
factors outlined above contribute to the irrelevance of TNWs based in Europe 
today.  
 
163 Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, 
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V. THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS: COUNTERPRODUCTIVE 
IN TODAY’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter analyzes the argument that TNWs are counterproductive in 
today’s security environment.  The chapter explains how forward basing TNWs in 
Europe negatively impacts nonproliferation and arms control efforts.  It begins by 
exploring NATO’s schizophrenic approach to deterrence and nonproliferation.  
Under a situation of general deterrence, forward basing TNWs in Europe is a 
strategy in search of a threat.  I show that emphasizing the utility of these 
weapons enhances rather than deters proliferation.  The chapter then addresses 
the controversial U.S. interpretation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) 
with regard to nuclear sharing—the United States considers the NPT prohibitions 
on transferring nuclear weapons to be non-controlling during wartime—
demonstrating the potentially severe consequences of this arrangement for 
nonproliferation and arms control.   The continued deployment of TNWs in 
Europe and emphasis on their utility also undermines Alliance cohesion and the 
confidence and security building measures issued by NATO’s nuclear-weapon 
states.  The chapter also analyzes the impact of NATO’s TNW policy on the 
NATO-Russia security relationship, addressing issues of partnership and 
cooperation, TNW utility in Russia, arms control and nonproliferation.  The 
arguments presented in this chapter highlight that the TNW basing policy is 
counterproductive in today’s security environment. 
 
A. ALLIANCE SCHIZOPHRENIA: DETERRENCE AND 
NONPROLIFERATION 
NATO officials claim the Alliance’s nuclear policies support both 
deterrence and nonproliferation.  According to NATO’s latest Strategic Concept, 
the Allies’ nuclear forces “continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring 
uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response 
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to military aggression.”164  NATO further stipulates that the “Allies have 
maintained a long-standing commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-
proliferation as an integral part of their security policy…”165  This schizophrenic 
approach to security—emphasizing the utility of TNWs which simultaneously 
attempting to convince others they are not necessary for security—complicates 
nonproliferation efforts.  According to a September 2003 policy brief, this 
approach “undermines the moral credibility of NATO and its member States 
when promoting WMD nonproliferation worldwide.”166  The shift from a situation 
of immediate deterrence to one of general deterrence and the implications of this 
shift vis-à-vis theater nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; the discontinuity 
between NATO’s nuclear sharing and the NPT; and the impact of U.S. TNWs in 
Europe on Alliance cohesion and CSBMs demonstrate why these weapons are 
counterproductive in today’s security environment.   
 
1. Immediate to General Deterrence: Implications for 
Nonproliferation 
Theater nuclear weapons were deployed and maintained in Europe during 
the Cold War as a strategy based on the perception of an immediate deterrence 
situation.  With its enormous conventional and nuclear military capability, the 
Soviet Union was seen as an aggressive expansionist enemy willing to invade 
Western Europe on a moment’s notice.  Deterrence, however, has changed 
since the Cold War.  The difference is that today’s strategic environment is 
governed by a situation of general deterrence as opposed to immediate 
deterrence.  According to Morgan, 
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In general deterrence an actor maintains a broad military capability 
and issues broad threats of a punitive response to an attack to 
keep anyone from seriously thinking about attacking.  In immediate 
deterrence the actor has a military capability and issues threats to a 
specific opponent when the opponent is already contemplating and 
preparing an attack.  Thus an immediate deterrence situation is a 
crisis, or close to it, with war distinctly possible, while general 
deterrence is far less intense and anxious because the attack to be 
forestalled is still hypothetical.167
Morgan’s vision accurately describes the world today.  Instead of a focusing on a 
single, monolithic threat, NATO now asserts the “security of the Alliance remains 
subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-
directional and often difficult to predict.”168  Although the security environment 
has changed dramatically, NATO strategy remained the same.  The continued 
deployment of U.S. TNWs in Europe is a strategy in search of a threat.   
The problem imposed by this situation is precisely that threats will emerge.  
This is the classic “security dilemma” and “spiral model” theory which still 
operates today.  According to Robert Jervis, “When states seek the ability to 
defend themselves, they get too much and too little—too much because they 
gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, 
will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state’s security.”169  
Continuing to emphasize the utility of TNWs could have disastrous ramifications 
for nonproliferation because if the world’s greatest military power identifies a role 
for these weapons in national security, weaker states will surely follow suit.  An 
Indian general reportedly asserts that “if the U.S. and others keep nuclear 
weapons to deal with regional threats, then nuclear discrimination remains and 
‘There is no alternative to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles if you are to live 
in security and with honor.’”170  In this context, maintaining U.S. TNWs in Europe 
undermines the fundamental purpose of the NPT. 
 
167 Morgan, Deterrence Now, 9. 
168 “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, April 1999, para. 20. 
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The nuclear nonproliferation treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the 
international effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Despite its 
long history and ardent support in many corners, the NPT has proven 
unsuccessful in disarming the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and preventing the 
spread of nuclear weapons material to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).  
Indeed, as the recent discoveries of Pakistan’s proliferation activity demonstrate, 
the “spread and potential use of nuclear weapons remains all too real.”171  At a 
time when nonproliferation reigns as the world’s greatest security concern, 
emphasizing the warfighting prospects and usability of theater nuclear weapons 
enhances, rather than deters, proliferation of WMD.  In discussing the possible 
impact of the new Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Binoy Kampmark 
acknowledges, “A new kind of proliferation is being encouraged in the field of 
smaller nuclear devices.  The new strategy of the NPR suggests the employment 
of nuclear weapons against signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Iraq, 
Syria, North Korea, Libya) notwithstanding that these countries officially do not 
have nuclear weapons.  This merely encourages them to seek countering 
technologies.”172  Bush administration officials rebuff such conclusions, as 
Nuclear National Security Agency (NNSA) Administrator Linton Brooks decried in 
June 2004: “I’ve never met anyone in the Administration who can foresee 
circumstances in which we would consider nuclear preemption to counter rogue 
state WMD threats.”173  Perception is reality, however, and for rogue states the 
perception is that nuclear weapons equate to strength and security.  
Emphasizing their utility, through their continued deployment in Europe, serves to 
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2. NATO Nuclear Doctrine and the NPT 
NATO’s nuclear doctrine is at odds with member-state commitments to the 
NPT.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the Alliance’s controversial 
interpretation of the NPT prohibition to transfer nuclear weapons.  Many analysts 
and signatories to the NPT question whether NATO’s nuclear sharing 
arrangements fall in line with the letter and spirit of the treaty. 
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was signed on July 1, 1968 and 
entered into force March 5, 1970.  In addition to recognizing the existence of 
nuclear-weapon states (United States, United Kingdom, France, China and the 
Soviet Union—succeeded by Russia) and non-nuclear weapon states (all 
others), the treaty obligated all states to refrain from transferring nuclear 
weapons or weapons-related technology between them.  These stipulations are 
contained in Articles I and II: 
• Article I:  Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in 
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear 
weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices. 
• Article II:  Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty 
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor 
whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to 
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.174 
At the time the NPT was negotiated, U.S. theater nuclear weapons were 
already deployed to Europe and NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements were in 
place.  Obviously, NATO wanted these arrangements to remain intact under the 
NPT, and the U.S. interpretation of the treaty aimed to do just that.  According to 
                                            
174 Department of State, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 
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a Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN) Research Report, the 
U.S. view is that the NPT “does not deal with arrangements for deployment of 
nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve any transfer of 
nuclear weapons or control over them unless and until a decision were made to 
go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.”175  This 
exception—the treaty does not apply in time of war—created a loophole through 
which NATO maintained its sharing arrangements for employing theater nuclear 
weapons deployed on Allied territory.  NATO’s position creates a situation in 
which, according to a once-classified description of nuclear sharing, “As a result 
of NATO’s commitment to the nuclear mode of defense, the non-nuclear NATO 
partners in effect become nuclear powers in time of war.”176  NATO states its 
position on the controversy directly in a 2004 fact sheet: 
• The Alliance's arrangements for basing U.S. nuclear gravity 
bombs in Europe are in compliance with the NPT. When the 
Treaty was negotiated, these arrangements were already in 
place. Their nature was made clear to key delegations and 
subsequently made public. They were not challenged.  
• The U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe are in the sole 
possession and under constant and complete custody and 
control of the United States. They are fitted with sophisticated 
Permissive Action Links (PAL) that guarantee absolute positive 
control by the U.S. and prevent unauthorized use.177 
The second point is not debated, although it only applies until a decision is made 
to transfer control of the weapons to a NATO pilot charged with delivering them 
in time of war.  The controversy emerges with respect to the first point.   
There are indications that the U.S. interpretation was not widely known at 
the time the NPT was signed.  In a 1968 letter to the Secretary of Defense, 
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach stated, “We do not believe it 
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would be in our interest or that of our allies to have a public discussion of the US 
interpretations prior to the time when the NPT is submitted to the Senate for 
advice and consent.”178  It appears that this was indeed the case as the first 
public release of the U.S. interpretation came on 9 March 1968, eight days after 
the official NPT signing ceremony, in a document entitled Questions on the Draft 
Non-Proliferation Treaty asked by US Allies together with Answers given by the 
United States.179  Records indicate that the Questions and Answers document 
was shown to the NATO Allies, the Soviets, and key members of the Eighteen 
Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC)—the multilateral body conducting the 
negotiations on the treaty—prior to the signing ceremony.180  However, other 
parties were not privy to the U.S. interpretation of the treaty prior to acceding to 
it, and non-NATO ENDC states unaware of NATO’s nuclear sharing 
arrangements would not have understood the implications of the Questions and 
Answers document.  In a specific effort to close the loophole nearly twenty years 
later, the 1985 NPT Review Document included language making the NPT 
provisions under Articles I and II controlling “under any circumstances.”181  This 
provision, however, is more politically than legally binding. The United States and 
NATO continue to subscribe to their controversial interpretation of the NPT. 
The political implications for nonproliferation and future arms control 
efforts are potentially severe.182  On one hand, other NWS such as Russia, 
China or Pakistan could follow the same logic and create similar nuclear sharing 
arrangements with NNWS.  In this case, NATO has “established a pattern it does 
not want others to emulate.”183   On the other hand, the possibility exists for 
NATO to create the conditions under which nuclear sharing could be put into 
action—simply by declaring war.  If, in the course of the War on Terrorism, NATO 
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nuclear doctrine evolved to include a role for counterproliferation, such as is 
widely attributed to U.S. doctrine under the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. 
theater nuclear weapons in Europe could conceivably be used against those 
possessing or believed to possess WMD or their means of delivery.  According to 
the PENN Report, policy changes along these lines were in the works during the 
2000 review of NATO’s strategy document MC400.   
NATO recognizes the controversial nature of this issue, as highlighted in 
an interview with a Senior NATO Diplomat: “It’s an uncomfortable topic that 
people prefer not to discuss.  It does raise questions, I know, under the NPT, the 
negative security assurances.”184  The outcome of these discussions, as well as 
details from the 2002 Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group 
guidance on NATO’s dual-capable aircraft posture, remain classified.  Pursuing 
such a policy, however, could signal NATO’s intent to violate the Negative 
Security Assurances given to NNWS in 1995, constitute a breach of Articles I and 
II of the NPT concerning nuclear sharing, and ultimately undermine NATO’s 
nonproliferation and arms control efforts.   
This is not to suggest that NATO is necessarily considering such actions, 
but rather that the nuclear sharing arrangements codified by the existence of 
U.S. TNWs on European soil raise international concerns for the nonproliferation 
regime.  According to a BASIC report, “More than 100 nations including South 
Africa, Egypt and the entire Non-Aligned Movement, have consistently expressed 
concern that members of NATO, especially Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Turkey, as well as the United States, are themselves nuclear 
proliferators, acting against the intent and possibly the letter of the NPT.”185  The 
situation exacerbates the “haves” versus “have nots” dilemma created by the 
NPT in that NATO’s NNWS exploit a loophole in order to get nuclear weapons 
while other NNWS cannot.  NATO’s continued support for keeping U.S. TNWs in 
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Europe undermines international confidence in the NPT and is clearly 
counterproductive in today’s security environment. 
 
3. Alliance Cohesion 
NATO argues that the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is necessary to 
maintain Alliance cohesion and the transatlantic link.  Ironically, arguments 
supporting the utility of TNWs today may actually divide NATO, making the 
forward basing policy counterproductive to European security.  This possibility 
emerges from the potential role of TNWs in NATO counterproliferation policy. 
NATO nuclear policy has traditionally mirrored U.S. policy.  This is not 
surprising given that the United States provides the preponderance of NATO’s 
nuclear assets.  The recent shift in U.S. nuclear policy, however, has raised 
concerns for some Allies over the future course of NATO policy.  Some Allies 
take issue with the possibility of using nuclear weapons in counterproliferation, 
particularly in a preemptive fashion as potentially envisioned by the U.S. National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.  One senior European 
diplomat has strongly staked out the European position on the issue: “If you think 
we are going to let the Americans throw nuclear weapons around on Europe’s 
periphery, then you must be crazy.”186  During a recent NATO exercise, however, 
this is precisely the issue that divided the Allied participants.187  According to the 
Center for European Security and Disarmament (CESD), the United States 
attempted to introduce preemptive conventional and possibly nuclear strikes as 
part of Crisis Management Exercise CMX 2002—a move which was “met with 
strong resistance from all other NATO nations except Turkey.”188  The following 
excerpt from CESD’s NATO Notes best describes the dynamics of the situation:   
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It is still unclear how the organization [NATO] could actually 
contribute were the U.S. to decide to take pre-emptive action.  At 
the moment, there is some agreement among NATO insiders that 
that ‘the Alliance will not be the primary vehicle to carry out such an 
initiative.’  One official points out that ‘even if there was evidence 
that a rogue state was imminently launching an attack with NBC 
weapons, the Allies would not be able to do anything and the U.S. 
would have to go it alone.  At best, NATO could give political 
support or another invocation of Article V.’  In NATO’s last crisis 
management exercise (CMX 2002), NATO tested its response to a 
scenario in which a Middle Eastern country was ready to attack 
Turkey with biological and chemical weapons, and in which bio-
terrorist attacks had already been carried out on NATO territory.  
Facing the reluctance of the other Allies to agree on pre-emptive 
action, the United States and Turkey declared themselves ready for 
such strikes, with or without the participation of others.  The 
demonstrated lack of cohesion among the Allies, coupled with 
NATO’s cumbersome decision-making process, has most likely led 
the United States to confirm that during a real crisis, operating 
through the Alliance would not be efficient.189
The lack of cohesion actually forced NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to 
end the exercise early “to prevent open conflict emerging between allies.”190  The 
reality is that when faced with the potential requirement to transition from political 
deterrence to actually contemplating the use of U.S. forward-deployed TNWs in 
response to a WMD threat, Alliance cohesion would very likely unravel.  
In this regard, the contemporary debate bears some resemblance to the 
debates over nuclear doctrine in the 1960s.  NATO strategy is left ambiguous 
such that the United States can interpret it as supporting its emerging doctrine 
while other NATO nations can argue that it does not.  The ability to do so is 
extremely important for NATO’s European members because if such a 
contentious issue emerged in public debate, European governments may well 
face a repeat of the domestic political unrest of the 1970s and 1980s regarding 
nuclear issues.  Today the European public treats nuclear weapons with 
ambivalence.  According to Harald Mϋller, “Reports about the chaotic situation in 
the nuclear world, and about the illegal trading that goes on in it, have not 
 
189 Ibid., 55. 
190 Ibid. 
87 
                                           
aroused the same kind of public concern as did the previous perception of an 
immediate threat of nuclear war.”191  No European government can openly admit 
to planning to fight and win a nuclear war, especially one against an adversary 
armed with non-nuclear WMD, in which preemptive nuclear strikes might be 
launched from European soil; such a pronouncement would most assuredly 
reopen old wounds.  Under the current basing policy, NATO’s European 
members may well find themselves playing an advanced version of two-level 
games with the United States in which domestic politics exert a great deal of 
influence over Alliance strategy.192  Removing the remaining U.S. TNWs from 
Europe, on the other hand, would alleviate these pressures on the Allies and 
avoid a situation where Alliance cohesion is placed in jeopardy due to 
disagreement over the use of forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons.   In this 
context, maintaining the forward-basing policy unnecessarily endangers Alliance 
cohesion and is therefore counterproductive to European security. 
 
4. Confidence and Security Building Measures 
Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) are valuable 
nonproliferation and arms control tools, yet U.S. TNWs based in Europe 
undermine their effectiveness.  CSBMs are intended to reduce the likelihood of 
armed conflict and prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation.  According to 
Ronald Lehman, Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), such as 
positive security assurances (PSAs)—commitments to aid nations threatened by 
WMD that have agreed to forego these weapons—and negative security 
assurances (NSAs)—commitments not to use WMD against nations who have 
agreed to forego these weapons, can be effective from a counterproliferation 
standpoint provided they are accompanied by “a change in either real intent or in 
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real military capability.”193  While there is no guarantee that CSBMs will be 
effective, their intrinsic value is psychological, in the same way that the value of 
deterrence is psychological.   
The psychological value of CSBMs stems from the notion of positive 
reciprocity.  Cooperation theorists explain how and why cooperation succeeds in 
international relations using this concept.  In essence, these theorists argue, 
according to David Cortright and Andrea Gabbitas, that “Positive responses to 
conciliatory gestures offer the best prospect for mutually beneficial 
cooperation.”194  Utilizing game theory, Robert Axelrod demonstrates how a 
simple tit-for-tat strategy in which one actor responds in kind to gestures of 
another actor, proves highly successful for achieving cooperation.195  The 1991 
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives stand as a powerful example of positive 
reciprocity and demonstrate the ability of CSBMs to foster cooperation in the 
nuclear arena. 
NATO’s nuclear-weapon states have issued both positive and negative 
security assurances as well as pledged support for other CSBMs such as 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ).  Yet proliferation still occurs.  NATO 
officials argue that the Alliance’s “residual sub-strategic nuclear arsenal—which 
has been dramatically reduced and its land-based forces de-alerted and de-
mated—is not responsible for nuclear proliferation.”196  While U.S. TNWs in 
Europe may not be solely responsible for nuclear proliferation, NATO’s Janus-
faced nuclear policy clearly contributes to the problem.  According to a 
September 2003 Policy Brief issued by the Middle Powers Initiative, “The 
maintenance of a security policy based on nuclear weapons for the purpose of 
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achieving greater political power, however, is extremely dangerous, since it 
inevitably invites others to follow suit.”197  Moreover, emphasizing the utility of 
these weapons undermines NATO’s moral credibility in influencing other states to 
forego nuclear programs of their own.  The PNIs were an incremental step 
toward changes in intent and capability; however they stopped short of 
demonstrating real change.  NATO’s reluctance to take the next step hampers 
the effectiveness of CSBMs designed to promote nonproliferation. 
NATO simultaneously promotes nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation in 
its security policies.  This schizophrenic approach emphasizing the value of U.S. 
TNWs in Europe is actually counterproductive to European security because it 
undermines NATO’s nonproliferation efforts.  Theater nuclear weapons in Europe 
represent a holdover from the Cold War situation of immediate deterrence.  
Today, emphasizing the utility of these weapons enhances, rather than deters, 
proliferation of WMD.  Moreover, NATO’s nuclear doctrine is at odds with 
member states NPT commitments.  The nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO 
are seen by many as de facto proliferation due to the controversial U.S. 
interpretation of Articles I and II.  Continued reliance on the forward-basing policy 
runs counter to the goals of the nonproliferation regime.  This policy also 
threatens Alliance cohesion due to differing positions on the actual role of 
forward-based U.S. TNWs in NATO counterproliferation policy.  Finally, NATO’s 
continued reliance on forward-based TNWs for political power limits the success 
of CSBMs designed to promote cooperation in nonproliferation.  Contrary to 
NATO doctrine, the U.S. TNWs in Europe are actually counterproductive for 
European security. 
 
B. THE NATO-RUSSIA SECURITY RELATIONSHIP 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe have also long been a source of 
friction in the NATO-Russia security relationship, and they continue to pose 
difficulties today.  Both NATO and Russian officials tout partnership and 
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cooperation as the foundation of their post-Cold War security relationship, yet the 
continued deployment of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe serves as a 
roadblock to cooperation.  Given the state of its conventional forces, Russia 
values the deterrent effect of its TNW arsenal much the same as NATO did 
during the Cold War.  NATO enlargement only accentuates such Russian 
insecurities.  By emphasizing the utility of these weapons, and maintaining a 
strategy of forward basing them in Europe, NATO perpetuates an immediate 
deterrence situation where one does not exist.  Removing these weapons could 
be a first step toward persuading Russia that its TNWs are equally irrelevant and 
create the possibility for genuine arms control for theater nuclear weapons.  
Opening the door to cooperation with Russia by removing U.S. theater nuclear 
weapons from Europe could have spillover effects in the area of nonproliferation 
as well, in the form of increased transparency and improved security of the 
Russian TNW arsenal.  With respect to the NATO-Russian security relationship, 
maintaining the deployment of U.S. TNWs in Europe is a counterproductive 
strategy. 
 
1. Partnership and Cooperation 
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
NATO-Russia security relationship has moved steadily toward partnership and 
cooperation.  This trend actually began while the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
was taking place; formal relations between the two emerged during the inaugural 
meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later renamed the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council).  This new council was specifically created to “foster 
a new cooperative relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.”198  From this cautious beginning, relations improved as Russia joint the 
Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and participated alongside NATO 
peacekeepers in Bosnia in 1996.  From the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), 
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established in May 2002, NATO member states and Russia endeavored “to work 
more closely together towards the common goal of building a lasting and 
inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic Area.”199  Despite setbacks from differing 
perspectives on the crisis in Kosovo, NATO-Russia relations improved 
significantly during this period. 
Today the NRC serves as a “mechanism for consultation, consensus-
building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action,” in which the Allies and 
Russia work together as equals “at 27.”200  NATO and Russia work as partners, 
cooperating in areas of mutual interest such as “the fight against terrorism, crisis 
management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, 
theatre missile defence, logistics, military-to-military cooperation, defence reform 
and civil emergencies.”201  Despite this atmosphere of partnership and 
cooperation, theater nuclear weapons continue to have utility in Russia. 
 
2. TNW Utility in Russia 
Russian perceptions of the utility of theater nuclear weapons figure 
prominently in the NATO-Russia security relationship precisely because Russian 
views and policies reflect the difficulty of cooperation on this issue.  According to 
David Yost, Russian declarations and actions reveal the “great and possibly 
increasing importance” of TNWs in Russia today.  Russian perceptions provide 
insight into why U.S. TNWs in Europe serve as a roadblock to cooperation on 
arms control and counterproliferation. 
Russian observers have attributed several functions to their theater 
nuclear weapons.  First, Russia values these weapons for deterrence.  Although 
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Russia has concerns about deterring other countries from possible aggression 
and use of WMD by non-nuclear weapon states and non-state actors, NATO 
remains the primary nuclear threat of concern.  Russian military officials cite, 
“The presence and high level of combat readiness of nuclear weapons is the best 
guarantee that the U.S. and NATO will not try to establish their ‘order’ in our 
country as well, like the way it was done in Yugoslavia.”202  The second function 
of Russia’s TNWs is to compensate for the adversary’s conventional superiority.  
Russia’s economic problems have decimated its defense budgets and left its 
conventional military capability in a state of decay.  Russian TNWs are seen as a 
means to “enable the country’s armed forces to avoid defeat in combat.”203  A 
third function of Russia’s TNWs is for the unique concept of “de-escalation” of 
conventional conflicts.204  Russian military theorists suggest that using limited 
TNW strikes might convince an adversary to end a conventional conflict while 
avoiding the possibility of further escalation to full-scale nuclear war.  A fourth 
function is to offset reductions in strategic nuclear forces.  “Against the 
background of continuing reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, the role of 
forces equipped with operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons is 
increasing.”205  Other functions have been identified as well, although these 
merely constitute variations of the four described above.206
Russia values its theater nuclear weapons for political reasons as well.207  
Preservation of its status in international politics, maintaining a position of 
regional importance, and wielding diplomatic leverage are cited as political 
rationales for Russia’s continued reliance on TNWs.  Moreover, NATO 
enlargement is a source of consternation and outright fear in Russian security 
circles.  NATO has consistently repeated its “three noes”—no intention, no plan, 
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and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons in new-member states, yet, despite 
these reassurances, Russia continues to regard such deployments as a threat to 
its security.208  Russian perceptions of the utility of TNWs stem from Cold War 
legacy impressions of NATO as a primary threat.  These perceptions run contrary 
to the spirit and intent of partnership and cooperation in the contemporary NATO-
Russia security relationship.  The implications are expressed clearly in a Middle 
Powers Initiative policy brief: “As NATO and Russia are working to achieve ‘a 
common and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, 
commitments and norms of behavior,’2 deploying tactical nuclear weapons that 
pose an unnecessary threat is damaging.  Worse, these continued deployments 
stimulate the quest for new military rationales.”209  This situation hinders 
prospects for arms control and nonproliferation. 
 
3. Arms Control 
NATO and Russian policymakers maintain diametrically opposed positions 
on TNWs.  NATO adheres to the political utility and deterrent effects of its TNW 
arsenal, while at the same time voicing a desire for Russia to reduce and gain 
control of its theater nuclear forces.  Russia, on the other hand, refuses to 
“consider negotiations to control its tactical nuclear arsenal if the United States 
will not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe.”210  This Russian position is 
certainly not new; indeed such demands date back to earliest deployments of 
U.S. TNWs in Europe.  Arms control for TNWs has received sporadic attention 
over the last several years.  During the Helsinki summit in 1997, Presidents 
Clinton and Yeltsin issued the following joint statement: “The Presidents also 
agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as 
separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched 
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cruise missile and tactical nuclear systems…”211  The Bush administration 
effectively killed the START III process, replacing it with the Moscow Treaty on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions (SOR), which made no reference to TNWs.  Both 
countries have concerns about the problem of TNWs, however neither side has 
pushed the issue to the forefront.  The real problem for arms control lies in 
finding a way to move beyond Cold War rhetoric and advance cooperation. 
The success of the 1991 PNIs demonstrates one way to achieve 
cooperation.  Leaders in both countries capitalized on opportunities created by 
the end of the Cold War to pursue unilateral, non-legally binding agreements.  
These very aspects, however, fuel arms control advocates criticism of the PNIs 
as lacking transparency and not being irreversible.212  The current Bush 
administration seems to prefer this unilateral approach; it views negotiated arms 
control agreements as “clumsy, time-consuming, and inflexible”213 and only 
reluctantly agreed to codify the SOR agreements in a formal treaty.  The 
administration’s logic is highlighted by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s contention: 
“arms control treaties are not for friends.”214  In some ways, both views have 
merit.  Unilateral reductions can bring about reciprocal cuts in nuclear forces, 
while codifying these actions in legally binding, transparent, and verifiable 
agreements assure both sides that promises will be carried out.  As Daalder and 
Lindsay argue in a recent Brookings Institution policy brief, 
Unilateral reductions are useful for jumpstarting weapons cuts. But 
both the process of reductions and the resulting force ceilings 
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should be fully binding to give not just Russia, but also the United 
States, confidence that statements of intent will in fact become 
reality.  Uncertainty about current and future intentions and 
capabilities promotes suspicion and stimulates others to hedge, a 
process that ultimately feeds upon itself…To paraphrase Ronald 
Reagan, trust but codify.215
Analysts have mixed views on prospects for unilateral initiatives and TNW arms 
control.  William Potter and Nikolai Sokov argue that a U.S. initiative to remove 
its residual TNWs in Europe could “go a long way towards dispelling Russian 
fears about NATO and could help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 
initiatives.”216  On the other hand, David Yost conjectures that the Russians 
might simply “pocket” a U.S. unilateral withdrawal as something they have long 
demanded or interpret such a move as indication of decreased U.S. commitment 
to European security—either way, they would be unlikely to pursue meaningful 
disarmament.217  Daalder and Lindsay disagree: 
The era in which such weapons performed a useful deterrent role 
has long passed. Even the 150 or so tactical bombs deployed in 
Europe with U.S. and NATO forces no longer fulfill any useful 
function at a time when NATO is inviting Russia to join its key 
deliberations, including talks on weapons of mass destruction. 
Eliminating these non-strategic weapons should also give Russia a 
powerful incentive to follow suit, and destroy the many thousands of 
weapons it still maintains in service and storage.218
Even if abandoning the long-standing policy of forward basing U.S. TNWs in 
Europe proves insufficient to induce Russia to eliminate all of its theater nuclear 
weapons, this step could remove an obstacle to further cooperation at relatively 
little strategic cost, given the nature of the transatlantic link today, NATO’s 
conventional superiority, and the general deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear 
forces.  “Furthermore,” according to Cortright and Gabbitas, “Russia’s current 
interest in a cooperative relationship with the United States appears to follow a 
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GRIT strategy centered around positive responses to U.S. policy moves, making 
it more likely that U.S. carrots could produce further Russian cooperation…”219  
Maintaining the U.S. TNWs is counterproductive for cooperation in arms control; 
in addition, these weapons further complicate cooperation in nonproliferation. 
 
4. Nonproliferation 
International interest in preventing the proliferation and use of WMD 
skyrocketed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United 
States.  This interest has extended into the NATO-Russia security relationship as 
evidenced by the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 “which reinforced 
the need for coordinated action to respond to common threats.”220  One of the 
major areas of concern for nonproliferation, and hence a substantial roadblock to 
cooperation in this area, is the Russian TNW arsenal. 
The security of Russia’s theater nuclear weapons is an issue of great 
concern in the West.  This concern emerges from a lack of transparency in the 
Russian theater nuclear arsenal.  Alexander and Millar point out, “The lack of 
information about the size of the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal raises 
uncertainties regarding the security of the storage of these weapons as well as 
about their protections against accidental, unauthorized, or illicit use.”221  This 
lack of transparency, combined with fears of “crime, corruption, incompetence, 
and institutional disintegration”222 in Russia create concern over the possibility of 
these weapons falling into the hands of rogue states or terrorists.  This is 
precisely where U.S. interests lie with respect to Russian TNWs.  As Secretary of 
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State Colin Powell described, the U.S. is “concerned with them more from the 
standpoint of we really don’t want these nukes loose anywhere; and as a 
proliferation problem more so than a war-fighting problem.  It’s almost a disposal 
problem more so than a war fighting problem.”223  The United States, NATO and 
the international community have put forth various programs and proposals 
aimed at dealing with the “loose nukes” problem. 
U.S. efforts to deal with the “loose nukes” problem began in 1991 with the 
Nunn-Luger program, so named for its congressional sponsors, Senators 
Richard Luger and Sam Nunn.  This set of initiatives included U.S. funding and 
technological assistance to help the newly independent states (NIS) of the former 
Soviet Union in deal with problems associated with their Cold War era nuclear 
stockpile.  Nunn-Luger evolved into the broader cooperative threat reduction 
(CTR) programs beginning in 1997, which are intended to: 
• facilitate the elimination, and the safe and secure transportation and 
storage, of nuclear, chemical and other weapons and their delivery 
vehicles;  
• facilitate the safe and secure storage of fissile materials derived from 
the elimination of nuclear weapons;  
• prevent the proliferation of weapons, weapons components and 
weapons related technology and expertise; and  
• expand military to military and defense contacts.224 
 
The CTR has become a central element of the U.S. nonproliferation effort, 
and has garnered support from the international community.  At the 2002 G-8 
summit in Canada, officials from the world’s leading economies created the 
Global Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass 
Destruction, pledging $20 million over ten years to the cause.  As of 2002, the 
CTR had accomplished much: 
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To date, Nunn-Lugar has deactivated more than 6,000 nuclear 
warheads, along with hundreds of bombers, missiles, and 
submarines. It is employing tens of thousands of Russian weapons 
scientists so they are not tempted to sell their knowledge to the 
highest bidder. The program also has made progress toward 
protecting and safeguarding nuclear material, biological weapons 
laboratories, and chemical weapons stockpiles. Beyond statistics, 
the Nunn-Lugar program has served as a bridge of communication 
and cooperation between the United States and Russia, even when 
other aspects of the relationship were in decline. It has improved 
military-to-military contacts and established greater transparency in 
areas that used to be the object of intense secrecy and 
suspicion.225
Despite such success, transparency has yet to be achieved vis-à-vis theater 
nuclear weapons. 
NATO has approached the subject several times with little success.  In 
December 2000, NATO proposed a set of transparency measures aimed at 
conducting reciprocal data exchanges on TNWs.  These proposals were included 
in a broad document entitled “Options for Confidence and Security Building 
Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-proliferation and Arms Control” designed 
to “enhance mutual trust and promote greater openness and transparency on 
nuclear weapons and safety issues between NATO and Russia.”226  Despite 
such efforts, “information presented by the Russian was extremely vague.”227  
The Russian refusal to share information on TNWs hinges on the continued 
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.  Recognizing this, some NATO 
members have suggested greater effort on the part of the Alliance.  In Lloyd 
Axworthy’s 2000 address to the North Atlantic Council, the Canadian official 
stated, 
Can we not be more transparent about how many nuclear gravity 
bombs we have left, and where they are located?  Can NATO not 
unilaterally reduce the number of remaining bombs further, and call 
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for a proportional parallel action by the Russian Federation?  Could 
we not take these sorts of measures to increase confidence with 
others, especially Russia, in order to pave the way for greater 
Russian openness on their huge sub-strategic stockpiles?228
The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is a reminder of the Cold War mentality.  
The forward basing policy serves as a roadblock to cooperation at a time when 
the NATO-Russia relationship centers on partnership and cooperation.  The 
concession of removing these weapons from Europe could pay dividends in 
terms of cooperation with Russia in the nonproliferation effort.   
U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe have also long been a source of 
friction in the NATO-Russia security relationship, and they continue to serve as a 
roadblock to cooperation.  Today the NATO-Russia Council serves to enhance 
consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action, yet 
in this environment, the utility placed by both NATO and Russian in their 
respective TNW arsenals prevents real cooperation in TNW arms control as well 
as counterproliferation.  A unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. TNWs might jump-
start arms control discussions if Russia continues to follow a GRIT strategy 
centered on positive reciprocity.  At the very least, removing these weapons from 
Europe could lead to increased transparency on Russian TNWs, a key element 
in the current international nonproliferation effort. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed the argument that TNWs are counterproductive in 
today’s security environment.  The chapter explains how forward basing TNWs in 
Europe negatively impacts nonproliferation and arms control efforts.  NATO 
simultaneously promotes nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation in its security 
policies.  This schizophrenic approach emphasizing the value of U.S. TNWs in 
Europe is actually counterproductive to European security because it undermines 
NATO’s nonproliferation efforts.  Theater nuclear weapons in Europe represent a 
holdover from the Cold War situation of immediate deterrence.  Today, 
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emphasizing the utility of these weapons enhances, rather than deters, 
proliferation of WMD.  Moreover, NATO’s nuclear doctrine is at odds with 
member states NPT commitments.  The nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO 
are seen by many as de facto proliferation due to the United States’ controversial 
interpretation of Articles I and II.  Continued reliance on the forward-basing policy 
runs counter to the goals of the nonproliferation regime.  This policy also 
threatens Alliance cohesion due to differing positions on the actual role of 
forward-based U.S. TNWs in NATO counterproliferation policy.  Finally, NATO’s 
continued reliance on forward-based TNWs for political power limits the success 
of CSBMs designed to promote cooperation in nonproliferation.  Contrary to 
NATO doctrine, the U.S. TNWs in Europe are actually counterproductive for 
European security. 
Both NATO and Russia continue to hold their TNWs in high regard.  This 
emphasis on the utility of these weapons creates an immediate deterrence 
situation where one does not exist.  This situation is particularly problematic as 
NATO and Russia pursue a security relationship based on partnership and 
cooperation.  Even if abandoning the long-standing policy of forward basing U.S. 
TNWs in Europe proves insufficient to induce Russia to eliminate all of its theater 
nuclear weapons, this step could remove an obstacle to further cooperation at 
relatively little strategic cost, given the nature of the transatlantic link today, 
NATO’s conventional superiority, and the general deterrent of U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces.  Maintaining the U.S. TNWs is counterproductive for cooperation 
in arms control, however, these weapons further complicate cooperation in 
nonproliferation.  The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is a reminder of the Cold 
War mentality.  Removing these weapons could, in fact, lead to increased 
transparency of the Russian TNW arsenal, and provide greater opportunities to 
improve the safety and security of these weapons and keep them out of the 
hands of rogue states and terrorists.  This chapter demonstrates how maintaining 
the policy of forward-basing U.S. theater nuclear weapons is counterproductive 
to European security today. 
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
People who read a long thesis, to coin a phrase, deserve a short 
concluding chapter.  To that end, this chapter succinctly brings the analysis 
together for policy prescription, or in other words, where do we go from here?  It 
begins by summarizing the arguments concerning political and military utility, 
relevance, and counter productivity of U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe.   
I then offer two policy options: (1) maintaining the status quo, and (2) withdrawing 
U.S. theater nuclear weapons from Europe. The political-military implications of 
each are evaluated.  In the final analysis, the thesis recommends withdrawing 
theater nuclear weapons from Europe in favor of a strategy emphasizing 
conventional deterrence supported by reassurance and the general deterrent of 
strategic nuclear weapons in the background. 
 
A. POLITICAL AND MILITARY UTILITY 
Arguments supporting the political and military utility of U.S. TNWs in 
Europe emerge from the rationale behind forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe 
during the Cold War.  Given the perceived conventional imbalance after the 
Second World War, NATO relied on TNWs to provide a military solution to the 
problem of deterring Soviet aggression and defending Western Europe.  The 
massive retaliation strategy became untenable with the emergence of nuclear 
parity between the United States and the Soviet Union.  This development 
spurred an evolution in NATO strategy focused on extending deterrence to 
Europe.  Extended deterrence required a condition of coupling between U.S. and 
European security interests which could only be achieved through a credible U.S. 
nuclear response and a demonstrated U.S. commitment to Europe.  Forward 
basing TNWs in Europe satisfied these requirements and solidified the 
transatlantic link.  The ambiguity over when and how they would be used under 
flexible response masked the strategic debate over the various extended 
deterrence strategies in order to ensure Alliance cohesion.  Above all, the utility 
of these weapons, and thus the strategy of basing them in Europe, stemmed 
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from the overarching belief that the Cold War existed within the context of an 
immediate deterrence relationship.  The nature of this deterrence relationship 
changed significantly with the end of the Cold War, however the strategy did not.  
The logic of extended deterrence and the condition of coupling created by 
forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe became entrenched in NATO strategic 
thought.   
U.S. policymakers support the TNW policy for traditional reasons as well 
as emerging roles.  The fall of the Soviet Union by no means assured that 
Europe was safe from aggression in the early post-Cold War years.  U.S. theater 
nuclear weapons in Europe, although reduced in quantity by the Presidential 
Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), retained their historical political and military utility.  In 
the twenty-first century strategic environment, U.S. officials see continued 
political and military utility in TNWs.  The new U.S. defense policy goals—assure, 
dissuade, deter and defeat—outlined in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, 
combined with the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemption and focus on 
counterproliferation laid out in the National Security Strategy and National 
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, highlight security concerns 
that make administration officials reluctant to give up options. 
NATO, as well, supports the continued deployment of TNWs in Europe 
based on traditional arguments for their utility in Alliance security.  From 1991 to 
1999, the Allies’ Strategic Concept emphasized their political utility in deterring 
any kind of war or coercion.  Although focused more on the volatile situation in 
the East in the early part of the decade, relations with Russia improved with time 
and a great deal of effort.  The Alliance offered reassurances to Russia regarding 
the status of its TNW arsenal and dual-capable aircraft readiness, yet at the 
same time it emphasized nuclear guarantees, roles and responsibilities to new 
members under the process of enlargement.  NATO’s nuclear doctrine today 
places greater emphasis on deterring threats posed by WMD proliferation and 
use.  Throughout this period, just as during the Cold War, NATO continued to 
place great value on U.S. nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to 
NATO, which “provide an essential political and military linkage between the 
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European and the North American members of the Alliance.”229  For NATO, 
widespread participation in nuclear sharing and nuclear consultative 
arrangements is a necessity for preserving the transatlantic link.  These 
arrangements assure Allies of U.S. commitment and symbolize the credibility of 
extended deterrence which alleviates the potential for proliferation within the 
Alliance.  In terms of utility, then, NATO’s European members think mainly 
politically while U.S. policymakers think both politically and operationally. 
 
B. POLITICAL AND MILITARY RELEVANCE 
Many analysts question the political and military relevance of TNWs in 
Europe today.  The nature of the transatlantic link is primarily economic and 
political, with military links maintained via conventional forces.  Economic 
interdependence and dense institutional arrangements couple the United States 
and Europe in ways far beyond the symbolic basing of U.S. theater nuclear 
weapons.  Without these weapons, NATO members would continue to participate 
in nuclear policy decision making through the political mechanisms in the Nuclear 
Planning Group and the requirement for consensus in NATO decision-making.  
American conventional deployments, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty itself, 
link the U.S. strategic umbrella to European defense, providing equal or greater 
utility than forward deployed TNWs.   
Theater nuclear weapons based in Europe may also be seen as irrelevant 
from the standpoint of credibility and the nuclear taboo.  Efforts to make TNWs 
more “usable,” such as the current feasibility studies of a Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator or “bunker buster,” may enhance the capabilities of TNWs, but will do 
little to alleviate the taboo against their use.  From this standpoint, these 
weapons offer no real credibility advantage over low-yield strategic nuclear 
forces, and pose a far less credible threat than modern conventional forces.   
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Conventional deterrence, by contrast, may be more effective than 
deterrence based on theater nuclear weapons.  Modern conventional forces not 
only can dominate on the battlefield, they now possess the capability to hold hard 
and difficult targets at risk in deterring the proliferation and use of WMD.  As 
congressional research analyst Jonathan Medalia points out, “U.S. forces 
demonstrated the ability of ground troops to attack tunnel complexes in 
Afghanistan and the ability of precision conventional ordnance to destroy 
underground bunkers in Iraq. It would be better, in this view, to spend funds on 
improving the ability to destroy these targets with conventional means rather than 
on nuclear weapons.”230  Conventional deterrence enables the United States to 
more credibly threaten what rogue leaders value most—regime survival—and 
this capability will only improve in the future.  For these reasons, TNWs based in 
Europe are irrelevant for European security today. 
 
C. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IN TODAY’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
TNWs in Europe are actually counterproductive in today’s security 
environment, particularly because of their negative impact on nonproliferation 
and arms control efforts.  NATO simultaneously promotes nuclear deterrence 
and nonproliferation in its security policies.  This schizophrenic approach 
emphasizing the value of U.S. TNWs in Europe is actually counterproductive to 
European security because it undermines NATO’s nonproliferation efforts.  
Theater nuclear weapons in Europe represent a holdover from the Cold War 
situation of immediate deterrence.  Today, emphasizing the utility of these 
weapons enhances, rather than deters, proliferation of WMD because it sends a 
signal that even the world’s greatest power sees TNWs as potentially usable and 
as necessary for security.  Moreover, NATO’s nuclear doctrine is at odds with 
member states Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments.  The 
nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO are seen by many as de facto 
proliferation due to the United States’ controversial interpretation of Articles I and 
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II—that these restrictions do not apply in times of war.  Continued reliance on the 
forward-basing policy runs counter to the goals of the nonproliferation regime.  
This policy also threatens Alliance cohesion due to differing positions on the 
actual role of forward-based U.S. TNWs in NATO counterproliferation policy.  
Finally, NATO’s continued reliance on forward-based TNWs for political power 
limits the success of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) 
designed to promote cooperation in nonproliferation because it undermines 
NATO’s moral credibility in influencing other states to forego nuclear weapons 
programs of their own.  Contrary to NATO doctrine, the U.S. TNWs in Europe are 
actually counterproductive for European security. 
Both NATO and Russia continue to hold their TNWs in high regard.  This 
emphasis on the utility of these weapons creates an immediate deterrence 
situation where one does not exist.  This situation is particularly problematic as 
NATO and Russia pursue a security relationship based on partnership and 
cooperation.  Even if abandoning the long-standing policy of forward basing U.S. 
TNWs in Europe proves insufficient to induce Russia to eliminate all of its theater 
nuclear weapons, this step could remove an obstacle to further cooperation at 
relatively little strategic cost, given the nature of the transatlantic link today, 
NATO’s conventional superiority, and the general deterrent of U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces.  Maintaining the U.S. TNWs is counterproductive for cooperation 
in arms control, and these weapons further complicate cooperation in 
nonproliferation.  The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is a reminder of the Cold 
War mentality.  Removing these weapons could, in fact, lead to increased 
transparency on the Russian TNW arsenal, and provide greater opportunities to 
improve the safety and security of these weapons and keep them out of the 
hands of rogue states and terrorists.  For these reasons, maintaining the policy of 





D. POLICY OPTIONS 
Two potential policy options emerge from this analysis.  The first is to 
maintain the status quo, in which U.S. theater nuclear weapons remain forward-
based in Europe.  The second is withdrawing these weapons from Europe and 
relying on other means to provide security for the Atlantic Alliance.  The 
remainder of this chapter highlights the political and military implications of each 
and provides final recommendations for the future. 
1. Status Quo 
U.S. and Allied risk assessments and interests could lead to a decision to 
maintain the TNW deployments in Europe for the foreseeable future.  In this 
view, threat uncertainties in future Russian political and military developments 
could create a desire among NATO officials to maintain a hedge in nuclear 
capabilities.  However, given recent statements by both U.S. and Allied officials 
regarding the NATO-Russia security relationship, perhaps an even greater 
impetus lies in the threat of WMD proliferation and use.  NATO’s increasing role 
in “out of area” operations and its proximity to volatile areas in the Middle East 
could support a continued reliance on a theater nuclear deterrent.  The fact that 
these weapons are closer to potential adversaries than those stationed in the 
United States could enhance U.S. counterproliferation strategy, and future 
upgrades, as envisioned in the Nuclear Posture Review, to an existing NATO 
capability may be politically easier to achieve.  Traditional political arguments for 
Alliance cohesion could be maintained, including reassuring Allies of U.S. 
commitment and credibility and ensuring widespread sharing of nuclear roles and 
responsibilities.   
The status quo policy option has potential drawbacks as well.  Maintaining 
these weapons in Europe and emphasizing their utility creates an immediate 
deterrence situation where one does not exist.  If the greatest military power, and 
by extension, the strongest alliance in the world, claim TNWs are required for 
security, then smaller, less powerful states in much more precarious security 
situations will surely follow suit.  These weapons enhance, rather than deter, 
proliferation of WMD.  NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements are seen as 
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incompatible with the letter and intent of the NPT, and maintaining these 
arrangements could undermine the Alliance’s position in supporting 
nonproliferation.  Moreover, stressing TNW utility reduces the psychological 
effectiveness of CSBMs designed to reassure non-nuclear weapon states and 
increases incentives for these states to acquire WMD.   NATO’s adherence to 
TNW utility complicates relations with Russia as well, and could continue to 
hinder prospects for cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation.  This is 
particularly troublesome when the security and stability of Russia’s nuclear 
complex is an area of deep concern with respect to the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.   
 
2. Withdrawal 
The United States and its Allies could, on the other hand, choose to 
withdraw the U.S. TNWs from Europe, relying instead on other means to provide 
security for Europe.  Such a policy would recognize the growing irrelevance of 
these weapons, given their decreasing credibility, the increasing importance of 
the nuclear taboo, and the capabilities inherent in modern U.S. and Allied 
conventional combat power.  Conventional forces today can dominate on the 
battlefield and also increasingly possess some capability to destroy hardened 
and difficult targets.  New conventional initiatives will enhance these capabilities 
in the future.  From the standpoint of rationality, retaliation and unbearable 
damage, conventional deterrence via modern forces may be more effective for 
threatening regime survival—a key factor in deterring, dissuading and defeating 
potential rogue states and WMD proliferators.  Removing U.S. TNWs from 
Europe would be an important disarmament step which could signal a change in 
real intent and real capability away from reliance on nuclear weapons for 
security.  This would enhance the effectiveness of CSBMs and provide greater 
reassurance for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon states.  By 
making NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements irrelevant, withdrawal would 
increase the credibility of Allies’ commitments to the NPT and enhance 
international efforts to stop the proliferation of WMD.  Moreover, removing the 
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residual U.S. nuclear presence in Europe would eliminate a significant roadblock 
to cooperation in NATO-Russia relations, which could lead to a reduction in 
Russian theater nuclear forces or at least increased transparency on the size and 
security of the Russian arsenal.   
Withdrawing the TNWs from Europe could be seen as a reduction in U.S. 
capability and removal of an option for the president in a crisis situation.  In 
reality, this is unlikely to be the case.  Given that the readiness of NATO’s dual-
capable aircraft for nuclear missions is now measured in months rather than 
minutes or hours, response time is now shorter for a strategic strike launched 
from the United States than it is for a tactical strike launched from NATO territory, 
should the worst possible scenario actually arise.  Arguments regarding the time 
factor apply primarily to the potential for preemptive strikes; however, it is highly 
unlikely that NATO would allow the preemptive use of nuclear weapons based in 
Alliance territory.  Such a decision could, in fact, greatly impact Alliance 
cohesion. 
The strongest criticism against removing U.S. TNWs from Europe revolves 
around the very issue of Alliance cohesion.  NATO’s conception of the 
transatlantic link and the essential political and military role of TNWs in 
maintaining a condition of coupling between the United States and Europe have 
become institutionalized to the point of bureaucratic opposition.  Yet the 
transatlantic link now reaches far beyond the symbolic basing of a few hundred 
nuclear gravity bombs on European soil.  Deep economic interdependence and 
dense institutional integration, combined with U.S. conventional commitments 
and the ultimate security guarantee of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence in the 
background characterize the nature of the transatlantic link today.  As former 
Supreme Allied Command Europe, Wesley Clark, properly asserts, “evolution 
and adaptation of the comfortable security fixtures of the past should be no 
cause for concern, for through such prudent adjustments we equip ourselves to 
confront the flux of events that time shall surely bring.”231  The time in which U.S. 
 
231 Wesley Clark, “The United States and NATO: The Way Ahead,” Parameters (Winter 
1999/2000), vol. 29, no. 4, 14. 
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TNWs played a pivotal role in European security is long past; these weapons are 
now in some ways irrelevant and counterproductive in others.   
 
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis examines whether basing theater nuclear weapons in Europe 
is a useful, irrelevant or counterproductive strategy for maintaining security in 
Europe today.  The underlying issues inherent in the contemporary debate are 
broad and complex, if not highly polemical.  The thesis approaches the issue of 
forward basing TNWs in Europe from a pragmatic point of view, seeking to 
enhance European security while reducing the risk of nuclear conflict through 
cooperation.  While cooperation in national security affairs is inherently difficult, it 
is also increasingly important in a security environment marked by global threats 
and WMD.  Based on this approach, the findings of this thesis support a policy 
recommendation of withdrawing U.S. theater nuclear weapons in Europe, relying 
instead on a strategy of conventional deterrence and reassurance while 
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